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INTRODUCTION 
No concept is more important in patent law than that of the “inven-
tion.”  In theory, the “invention” is what entitles an inventor to a patent and 
correspondingly defines the scope of his monopoly.1  The problem is that 
the meaning of “invention” differs depending on context.  It refers either to 
the specific working embodiment that the inventor created or to the broader 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.  Thanks to Eric Claeys, Ke-
vin Emerson Collins, John Duffy, Eric Goldman, Michael Green, Laura Heymann, Bruce Johnsen, Peter 
Lee, Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman, Adam Mossoff, Tylor Ochoa, Ted Sichelman, Sam Vermont, and 
participants at the Workshop at the University of Iowa College of Law, the Intellectual Property Scho-
lars Conference, the Virginia Junior Faculty Forum, the Santa Clara Patent Scholars Colloquium, and 
the Works in Progress IP Colloquium for comments on prior drafts of this Article. 
1  See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (“As a re-
ward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year mono-
poly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret.”).   
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idea that is the subject of the patent monopoly.  The failure to distinguish 
between these two meanings of “invention” causes much confusion. 
In the first sense of the word, an “invention” refers to a tangible and 
working apparatus or process.2  A person becomes entitled to a patent by 
creating a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter.”3  Unlike these tangible creations, a disembodied idea is not pa-
tentable subject matter.4  In this paradigm, Thomas Edison’s invention was 
a single incandescent lamp using carbonized bamboo filament,5 and the 
Wright brothers invented a single wooden glider that could barely fly.6 
In the other contexts of patent law, however, the term “invention” re-
fers to an idea, not the specific embodiment that the patentee creates.7  This 
occurs primarily in the determination of patent scope and infringement of 
the patent right.  It is well settled that, in the infringement context, patents 
protect the “principle” of the invention, not the particular form in which the 
patentee has embodied it.  Otherwise, an unscrupulous pirate can copy the 
idea while changing the form.8  In this paradigm, Edison’s invention was 
the idea of an incandescent lamp, which is manifested in both his original 
lamp and modern variants such as light bulbs using tungsten filaments, and 
the Wright brothers’ invention was the idea of an airplane, which is reflect-
ed in both their original glider and modern F-117 jets. 
The difference between ideas and embodiments is important.  An em-
bodiment contains many ideas at multiple levels of abstraction, and each 
individual idea can also be embodied in various alternative forms.9  Despite 
 
2  See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that patentable products must be 
tangible). 
3  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
4  Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) (“An idea of itself is not pa-
tentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is.”). 
5  See U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1879) (Edison’s electric lamp patent).  In fact, Edison’s 
original lamp used carbon wire, and carbonized bamboo was itself a later improvement.  See U.S. Patent 
No. 251,540 (filed Aug. 6, 1880). 
6  See U.S. Patent No. 821,393, at col. 1 ll. 103–04 (filed Mar. 23, 1903) (“[S]pars, bows, and ribs 
are preferably constructed of wood . . . .”). 
7  Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“The primary meaning of the word ‘invention’ 
in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a physical embodi-
ment of that idea.”). 
8  See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1908) (“The principle 
of the invention is a unit, and invariably the modes of its embodiment in a concrete invention may be 
numerous and in appearance very different from each other.” (quoting 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE 
LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 485, at 75 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1890))); Winans v. 
Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1853) (“[I]t is the duty of courts and juries to look through the 
form for the substance of the invention—for that which . . . the patent was designed to secure . . . .”); see 
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (noting that copyrights protect only expression whereas 
patents protect the idea itself).  
9  See Robin C. Feldman, The Inventor’s Contribution, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6, 24, http://www.
lawtechjournal.com/articles/2005/06_051223_Feldman.pdf (“A patent holder need only identify a single 
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the conceptual difference, patent law holds that the “invention” (meaning 
the embodiment) that creates the patent entitlement is the same as the “in-
vention” (meaning the idea) that defines patent scope for infringement.10  
This artificial conflation of idea and embodiment means that courts have 
tied themselves into knots trying to define a single idea as the “invention” 
when the described embodiment contains an infinite number of ideas.11  To 
take a concrete example, suppose an inventor produced a method of curing 
AIDS using radiation therapy, specifically using X-radiation, and then built 
a radiation machine that implemented the method.  This would be a work-
ing embodiment.  The ideas that underlie this cure can be broken into many 
different levels of abstraction, each progressively more specific and nar-
rower in the resulting patent’s scope: 
1. The idea of curing AIDS, covering all cures that might ever be devised. 
2. The idea of curing AIDS by using radiation therapy, covering all cures 
using any type of radiation but not other methods. 
3. The idea of curing AIDS by using radiation therapy specifically by using 
X-radiation, thereby excluding methods not using X-radiation. 
4. The idea of curing AIDS using radiation therapy specifically by using X-
radiation and more specifically by using the exact make and model of the 
patentee’s radiation machine. 
As can be seen from this example, each idea at a different level of abstrac-
tion can be accurately described as the “invention.”  A patentee choosing to 
claim his invention as “the cure for AIDS” would not appear to be wrong.  
By the same token, an accused infringer arguing that the patentee invented 
only one specific machine to cure AIDS and using only X-radiation would 
appear equally right.  Courts left to choose between these positions have no 
principled basis for doing so. 
How this choice is exercised, however, has tremendous consequences 
for both the incentives of inventors and the rights of subsequent improvers 
and users.  A patent covering the broad idea of curing AIDS would entitle 
the patentee to all cures for AIDS, even a later cure that used a pill instead 
of radiation.  This would provide a great incentive to obtain the patent, but 
it would also create a monopoly scope disproportionate to the inventor’s 
contribution.  After all, the patentee did not devise a cure with a pill; a later 
inventor who invents a cure with a pill would have his research hampered 
by such a broad patent, and some AIDS patients would be priced out of re-
                                                                                                                           
use and a single embodiment for the product to receive rights to a wide range of embodiments and all 
uses.”). 
10  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (“What is 
claimed by the patent application must be the same as what is disclosed in the specification . . . .”).  
11  See PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 39 (1975) (“A claim is an abstraction 
and generalization of an indefinitely large number of concrete, physical objects.”).  
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ceiving the improved cure by the monopoly prices.12  But that reasoning 
works just as well if the patentee receives only the narrower idea of a radia-
tion cure because a later innovator who finds a new cure with gamma radia-
tion instead of X-radiation would infringe the patent.  But again, our 
patentee did not invent curing AIDS with gamma radiation.  Granting the 
radiation patent will deter research into new cures for AIDS using different 
types of radiation as well as price some patients out of the improved cure.  
Indeed, this reasoning works all the way down the slippery slope until the 
patent covers only the specific radiation machine down to the last nut and 
bolt and paint color, at which point the patent becomes essentially worthless 
because even a pure pirate who does no research can avoid infringement by 
changing the paint color.13 
This task of defining patent scope—translating an embodiment into a 
protected idea—is a classic levels of abstraction problem.14  The choice be-
tween levels of abstraction as a means of expressing some idea or principle 
presents problems of arbitrariness, a difficulty well known in many areas of 
law.15  The problem is worse in patent law, however, because courts have 
not even acknowledged the nature of the problem.  Instead, courts routinely 
treat the idea and embodiment in a patent as the same thing so that the cor-
rect level of abstraction to express the idea is made to seem self-evident.16  
This only makes the task of ascertaining patent scope more difficult by ob-
scuring the process by which one level of abstraction is chosen from the 
many available.  The net result is that courts perform this choice implicitly 
and on an ad hoc basis, and the Federal Circuit devotes a sizable portion of 
its docket to determining the scope of individual patents during “claim con-
 
12  See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, Market Structure and Technical Advance: The Role 
of Patent Scope Decisions, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 185, 198–99 (Thomas 
M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) (“Wide patent scope that exceeds the enablement of the disclo-
sure makes anyone who attempts to invent in that area beholden to the patent owner.”). 
13  See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 459 (2d ed. 2003) (“If 
courts strictly limit the scope of patent protection to the specific examples disclosed in the specification, 
competitors could readily circumvent the patent through minor changes in design.”).  
14  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 
51 (2005) (arguing that there is no right level of abstraction in defining claims vis-à-vis accused prod-
ucts). 
15  See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (de-
scribing the levels of abstraction problem in copyright law); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Deci-
sis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928) (discussing the levels of abstraction at which a case’s holding can be 
characterized); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1065–71 (1990) (discussing the problem of abstraction in defining rights). 
16  See, e.g., Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The claims 
are directed to the invention that is described in the specification; they do not have meaning removed 
from the context from which they arose.”); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.”  
(emphasis omitted)).  
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struction” or Markman proceedings.17  The murky process and its seemingly 
arbitrary results mean that patent rights are subject to tremendous uncertain-
ty.18 
The facts that every invention exists on multiple levels of abstraction, 
and that a choice is necessary, shed light on many of the apparently irre-
solvable problems in modern patent law.  For example, a large body of 
scholarship discussing the Federal Circuit’s doctrinal conflict and high re-
versal rate in cases involving patent claim interpretation often characterizes 
the dispute as one over textual meaning.19  But because the text of a claim 
seeks to define the invention, many such claim interpretation cases are real-
ly disputes about the proper level of abstraction, which implicates substan-
tive policy rather than textual analysis.  Similarly, patent law’s doctrines of 
enablement and written description seek to define monopoly scope by 
equating such scope to the “invention” contributed.  The confused state of 
these doctrines has been noted elsewhere.20  Again, the ultimate problem 
underlying these doctrines is that the contributed invention can be ex-
pressed at multiple levels of abstraction, but judges must choose only one.  
The levels of abstraction framework thus demonstrates that a central tenet 
of the patent system—automatic calibration of reward to contribution—is 
an illusion.21 
My goal in this Article is not to articulate any bright-line rule to select 
one level of abstraction.  Rather, my aim is simply to demonstrate that the 
problem exists and that current doctrine fails to acknowledge it.  By demon-
strating that the levels of abstraction problem exists and that courts select 
among multiple possible levels of abstraction arbitrarily and silently, I pro-
vide the foundation for a more transparent analysis of the problem, in which 
 
17  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that the patent 
scope defined by claims is a legal question); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dis-
sent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1071 tbl.X 
(2007) (finding that claim construction was addressed in 51% of Federal Circuit opinions relating to pa-
tents between 1998 and 2005). 
18  See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 46–72 (2008); Gretchen Ann 
Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim 
Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 202–17 (2001).  
19  See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2000) 
(characterizing the two schools of scholarship as “hypertextualism” and “pragmatic textualism”); Kris-
ten Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 84 (2006).  
20  See, e.g., Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“This court’s written description jurisprudence 
has become opaque to the point of obscuring other areas of this court’s law.”); Bernard Chao, Rethinking 
Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 50–
52, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/chao-rethinking-enablement.pdf (discussing conflicts in doctrine). 
21  See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 402 (1960) (“That is 
one of the beauties of the patent system.  The reward is measured automatically by the popularity of the 
contribution.”).   
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relevant economic information can be collected and considered in determin-
ing the appropriate level of abstraction for patent rewards.  Part I of this Ar-
ticle describes the doctrines of scope—i.e., claim construction and 
enablement—and demonstrates that each doctrine of patent scope contains 
inherent contradictions that create indeterminacy.  Part II explores how the 
indeterminacy problems can be understood as a fundamental policy debate 
about the proper level of abstraction at which to characterize an invention.  
Part III then provides a more pragmatic framework within which to consid-
er the policy issues inherent in patent scope. 
I. THE UNITARY INVENTION FRAMEWORK AND ITS PROBLEMS 
A fundamental premise of patent law is what I call the “unitary inven-
tion principle,” which is that the two major components of a patent—the 
specification and the claims—both describe the same “invention.”22  Many 
of the doctrinal problems of patent law stem from the fact that this unitary 
invention principle is not true.  This Part first provides a background on the 
unitary invention principle and then describes the doctrinal problems that 
arise from reliance on this false premise. 
A. Background: The Specification and the Claims 
A United States patent is a complex document, but its two most impor-
tant components are the written description of the invention (often called 
the specification) and the claims.23  Both the specification and the claims are 
drafted by the patentee.24 
The specification describes the invention created by the patentee so 
that others can make and use it.25  This requires considerable detail: enough 
that the invention can be built from the ground up.  For example, a specifi-
cation describing a table should describe its specific shape (square or 
round); material (wood or plastic); manner of manufacture (using nails or 
screws); and what it is used for (dining tables or reading desks).  A useful 
way to think about the specification description is that it figuratively depo-
sits a physical embodiment of the patentee’s creation into the Patent Of-
fice—and thus into the public domain—using words.  Indeed, when words 
 
22  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (“What is 
claimed by the patent application must be the same as what is disclosed in the specification . . . .”); Bates 
v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). 
23  Strictly speaking, the specification includes both the written description and the claims.  In com-
mon parlance, however, the specification is used to refer only to the written description component of a 
patent, and I do so in this Article.  See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 39 (2008). 
24  Id. 
25  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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fail, as they often do in biotechnology, a physical deposit may be used in-
stead.26 
In contrast, a claim describes only the key inventive features of the in-
vention—those that form the essence of the patentee’s idea.27  For example, 
a claim to a table might read “an apparatus with a flat surface and four 
legs.”  Because claims recite only these fundamental features, claim lan-
guage is inherently generalized compared to the specification.  Whereas a 
specification description represents just one physical table, or a very limited 
number of tables, a claim to “an apparatus with a flat surface and four legs” 
will accurately describe many tables of all different sizes, colors, and mate-
rials. 
The generality of the claim corresponds to the scope of the patent.  
With minor exceptions,28 the rule in patent law is that anything that is liter-
ally described by a claim infringes, but anything not described by the claim 
does not infringe.29  One implication of this rule is that added elements do 
not defeat infringement once the minimum feature set is met.30  For exam-
ple, a four-legged table with a set of drawers and made of futuristic material 
is still “an apparatus with a flat surface and four legs,” and so it infringes.  
In this way, the scope of a patent is a class of embodiments sharing an idea 
captured by the claim whereas the specification describes only one particu-
lar embodiment within that class. 
Procedurally, obtaining a patent requires the patentee to first create the 
specification embodiment31 and then to write claims for it.32  There are es-
sentially two limits on writing a claim.  The first limitation is that the claim 
cannot cover anything previously in the public domain, which patent law-
yers call the “prior art.”33   
 
26   Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Wands, 
858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  
27  See ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 10:1.1 (6th ed. 
2010) (“The claims should cover the inventor’s concept.”). 
28  The primary exception is the doctrine of equivalents, which holds that an “insubstantial differ-
ence” between a feature of an accused product and the claim language does not defeat infringement.  See 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 40 (1997).  This element-by-element 
comparison still requires the doctrine of equivalents to operate within the strictures of the claim lan-
guage.  Id. at 29–30.  
29  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996). 
30  See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
28 (4th ed. 2007) (describing “open” claims). 
31  The patentee can create the embodiment actually or constructively.  Constructive reduction to 
practice entails describing the embodiment in detail in the specification.  Actually building a physical 
model is not required.  See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
32  See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 30, at 26 (noting that claims are “often modified extensively” 
after the patent application is filed).  
33  Id. at 27; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006). 
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Once the claim meets this novelty requirement, the second limitation is 
the unitary invention principle, which establishes that patent scope in the 
claim must cover the same invention as described in the specification.34  
The unitary invention principle reflects the fundamental idea of quid pro 
quo: the patentee receives as a monopoly only those things that he first 
created and nothing more.35  It also underlies the practical operation of the 
patent system, in which U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiners 
must make decisions on which patent claims to allow or deny.  Patent law 
regards it as extremely important that such decisions are purely ministeri-
al—that PTO bureaucrats simply allow or reject claims to monopoly re-
wards based on fixed statutory criteria, and judges reviewing the decisions 
do likewise.36  The idea is that it would be intolerable for research compa-
nies who invest millions of dollars toward new inventions (e.g., cures for 
AIDS) to have the scope of their patents—and thus the level of reward—
become a matter of judicial or bureaucratic whim.37  Rather, the scope of a 
patent and its reward should be calibrated by the patentee’s contribution.38  
Thus, the PTO must issue deserving patents and must reject undeserving 
ones: it has no substantive policy discretion.39  A patentee “is entitled to 
claims as broad as the prior art and his disclosure will allow.”40 
In addition to governing the scope of allowable claims and removing 
discretion, the unitary invention principle also helps the judicial administra-
tion of the patent system.  The precondition to determining infringement is 
that one must first understand what the claim language means.41  Assuming 
 
34  See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844–45 & nn.21–22 (1990) (“This fundamental principle—that legal protection 
is premised on an adequate disclosure of the invention—is built deep into the history of patent law.”). 
35  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 119–20 (1853) (“The specification of this patentee de-
scribes his invention or discovery, and the manner and process of constructing and using it; and his pa-
tent . . . covers nothing more.”); see Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
36  See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 189 (1933) (“The grant of letters 
patent is not, as in England, a matter of grace or favor, so that conditions may be annexed at the pleasure 
of the executive. To the laws passed by the Congress, and to them alone, may we look for guid-
ance . . . .”);  see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that 
the PTO lacks authority over substantive patent law). 
37  See Rich, supra note 21, at 402 (“That is one of the beauties of the patent system.  The reward is 
measured automatically by the popularity of the contribution.”). 
38  See id. 
39  See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) (stating that “if on such examination it appears that the applicant is 
entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor” (emphasis added)); Konin-
klijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cardiac Sci. Operating Co., 590 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The 
PTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority.”). 
40  Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added 
and emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).  
41  See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“An in-
fringement analysis involves two steps.  First, the court determines the scope and meaning of the patent 
claims asserted . . . .”). 
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that the claim and the specification describe the same thing, just in different 
ways,42 makes claim interpretation easier.  The specification is always more 
detailed than the claim, and a drawing in the specification is worth a thou-
sand words.43  Everyone can see how a physical radiation machine works, 
whereas claim language on paper is never quite as good.44  Looking to a 
concrete and detailed embodiment that represents the same invention as the 
one claimed can help clarify claim language.  The unitary invention prin-
ciple thus underlies the entire doctrine of patent scope, both determining 
what degree of scope is requested (claim construction) and whether it 
should be permitted (enablement and written description).  Vague claim 
language should be clarified by looking to the specification, 45  and the 
claimed monopoly should be allowed to cover only those things that the 
specification teaches.46  
The problem is that the unitary invention principle is not true.  The 
specification and the claims do not describe the same thing in different 
ways.  Rather, they describe entirely different concepts.  The specification 
describes a single embodiment (or a very limited number of embodiments).  
The claim describes an idea.  To be sure, the specification embodiment em-
bodies the claimed idea, but the claimed idea may be reflected in countless 
other embodiments; conversely, the specification embodiment also embo-
dies countless other ideas in addition to what is claimed.  The following 
sections describe the doctrinal confusion that has arisen from the mistaken 
conflation of these distinct concepts. 
B. Claim Construction 
In most patent cases, claim construction is the most important determi-
nant of the outcome.47  As mentioned earlier, claims (if they are valid) de-
fine the scope of the patent by specifying the features that must be present 
in an infringing product.48  A product infringes when it contains all the 
 
42  See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he two standards, 
while complementary, approach a similar problem from different directions.” (quoting Rengo Co. v. 
Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))). 
43  See id. at 1565 (finding the claimed “invention is what the ’081 drawings show”). 
44  Even if no physical embodiment is built, and the specification is also just a paper description, the 
specification description will always be considerably more detailed and concrete than the claim lan-
guage. 
45  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
46  See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
47  David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Compar-
ing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1699, 1708 (2009). 
48  A claim may also describe a process with one or more required steps.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–101 
(2006) (defining patentable inventions to include processes).  The infringement inquiry with process 
claims is not materially different. 
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claimed features, but an accused product that omits one or more required 
features does not infringe.  The recited features are known as the “ele-
ments” or “limitations” of a claim.49 
The problem addressed by claim construction, at least according to 
courts, is that claim language is often vague and difficult to apply.50  Claim 
construction is the process of taking the language of a claim and translating 
it concretely into a set of required features in the physical world,51 which are 
then either present or absent in an accused product.  This process has spe-
cial importance because, in most cases, there is no dispute about the ac-
cused product’s features.  A product accused of infringement is usually 
publicly sold or used—because it is the publicity that usually brings it to the 
notice of the patentee in the first place—and in any case an accused product 
can be brought into a courtroom for all to see.52  The only dispute is over 
whether the features of the accused product are described by the language 
of a claim.53  Once a judge construes the elements of a claim, most cases 
“either settle or are resolved on summary judgment.”54 
Like the formalism of the unitary invention principle, claim construc-
tion is supposed to be a textual exercise that permits no policy discretion.55  
In this view, courts are supposed to interpret a claim according to its lan-
 
49  See TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Under the ‘all elements’ rule, to find infringement, the accused device must contain ‘each limitation of 
the claim, either literally or by an equivalent.’” (quoting Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 
420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). 
50  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construc-
tion, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1760 (2009) (“The process of claim construction itself presumes that the 
words of the claims are insufficiently precise to delineate those boundaries.  The solution that claim con-
struction offers is to substitute theoretically clearer words for the unclear words of the patent claim.”); 
see Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he 
construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language: in order to un-
derstand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.”).  
51  Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 50. 
52  See, e.g., Gen. Mills v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D. Minn. 1996) (noting that 
“proper construction of a claim can make short work of the question of infringement” because a feature 
of the accused product was undisputed). 
53  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, 
J., concurring) (“[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.”). 
54  Mark A. Lemley, The Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1390 
(2007). 
55  Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Courts can neither 
broaden nor narrow the claims to give the patentee something different than what he has set forth.  No 
matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework claims.” (footnote 
omitted)); see Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp. 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim interpretation 
is the process of giving proper meaning to the claim language. . . .  Therefore, the language of the claim 
frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation.”). 
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guage,56 using only the standard tools of textual interpretation.57  This for-
malistic framework is necessary, according to the Federal Circuit, because 
the alternative of allowing policy discretion to enter the claim construction 
inquiry “would make infringement a matter of judicial whim.”58  In other 
words, formalism in claim interpretation is predicated on an artificial di-
chotomy under which judicial discretion is deemed to be equivalent to judi-
cial whim and the only perceived alternative is text-based mechanical 
jurisprudence.  Not only is this equation of discretion to whim untrue,59 the 
rhetorical emphasis on text in claim construction has not eliminated judicial 
discretion in this area.  Instead, the two most important canons of claim in-
terpretation are so self-contradictory that judges can reach almost any de-
sired result by selecting one rule or the other.60 
The first fundamental canon of claim construction is that claims should 
always be interpreted “in the light of [their] specifications.”61  This follows 
from the unitary invention principle.  Because the embodiment in the speci-
fication is the “invention” as much as the claim language, the two should be 
compared for context.62  The specification is much more detailed and often 
supplies details that abstract claims lack. 
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc. aptly demon-
strates the application of this rule. 63   In Kinetic Concepts, the patentee 
claimed a treatment for a “wound.”  The word “wound” is a commonly un-
derstood and generic concept, which usually includes any injury to body 
tissue.64  The specification of the patent, however, described only one type 
of wound: skin wounds.65  The Federal Circuit narrowed the broad claim 
language to the categories disclosed in the specification: “All of the exam-
 
56  Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng’g, Inc., 121 F.3d 691, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]hroughout the in-
terpretation process, the focus remains on the meaning of claim language.”). 
57  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–89 (1996) (characterizing claim con-
struction as another instance of “construction of written instruments”); see Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. 
Am. Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 410 (1905) (holding that courts “may not add to or detract from the 
claim”). 
58  SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (iden-
tifying consideration of the accused product as outside the scope of permissible claim construction). 
59  See infra text accompanying note 253. 
60  See Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 613 (2007) (“The 
indeterminacy of legal doctrine derives first and foremost from the available leeway in choosing the ap-
plicable rule rather than from the ambiguity of that rule once chosen.”); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1700 (1976). 
61  Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217 (1940). 
62  See, e.g., Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The claims 
are directed to the invention that is described in the specification; they do not have meaning removed 
from the context from which they arose.”). 
63  554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
64  See id. at 1018 (quoting STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1964 (26th ed. 1995)). 
65  Id. at 1018–19. 
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ples described in the specification involve skin wounds. . . .  To construe 
‘wound’ to include fistulae and ‘pus pockets’ would thus expand the scope 
of the claims far beyond anything described in the specification.”66  In short, 
because the claim and the specification described a single “invention,” the 
specification clarified that the generic word “wound” really translated to 
only one type of wound (skin wounds) in the real world. 
The problem with such an approach to claim construction, however, is 
that reducing abstractness (i.e., generality) through reference to the specifi-
cation embodiment has no limits.67  Just as a “wound” can be limited to 
“skin wounds” because those were the only type of wounds in the specifica-
tion embodiment, so too might “skin wounds” be further limited to, say, 
“skin wounds on the arm” if that were the only type of skin wound de-
scribed in the specification embodiment and so on.  The end of this slippery 
slope would be a patent that covered only the precise embodiment described 
in the specification, and changing just the paint color or body part would 
avoid infringement.  This would be bad for patent incentives because even 
an unsophisticated pirate would know how to change the paint color or take 
the Kinetic Concepts treatment method and use it on the leg. 
For this reason, the second fundamental canon of claim construction 
holds that courts must never “import[] limitations from the specification in-
to the claim.”68  Instead, the claim language alone “measures the grant” of a 
patent.69  But a claim is only a list of limitations,70 so the effect of interpret-
ing a claim by reference to the specification must be to add limitations that 
a court otherwise would not read into the claim.71  In other words, if  courts 
reach exactly the same interpretation whether or not they consider the speci-
fication, then the first rule of claim interpretation is meaningless.  But a 
court reaching a different interpretation because it considered the specifica-
tion thereby imports a limitation from it in violation of the second rule.  The 
two rules thus flatly contradict each other, as many commentators have 
noted,72 and as even courts themselves have seemingly acknowledged.73  In-
 
66  Id. at 1019. 
67  See McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895) (“[I]f we once begin to include 
elements not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim . . . , we should never know where to 
stop.”). 
68  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
69  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277 (1949). 
70  See supra text accompanying note 49. 
71  See Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“One purpose for examining the 
specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of the claims.”). 
72  E.g., Robert Unikel & Douglas Eveleigh, Protecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers: The Availa-
ble Patent Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 88 n.9 (2006) (“How one 
can read claims ‘in light of the specification’ but yet avoid importing limitations from the specification 
has never been adequately explained, perhaps because these ostensibly contradictory tenets of claim 
construction cannot be reconciled.”); see, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 30, at 803. 
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determinacy in claim construction law thus arises not (as is commonly sup-
posed) because the text is linguistically vague but because of contradictory 
doctrine. 
Contradictory doctrine makes claim construction outcomes difficult to 
predict without litigation, and judicial disagreement frequently arises when 
such issues are litigated.74  Courts sometimes grant the broad scope reflected 
by the plain language of a claim and sometimes limit the claim to a precise 
embodiment in the specification.  Most often, though, courts reach some 
middle position in which the claim is not as abstract as the language reflects 
but still encompasses more than the specification embodiment.  Although 
litigated outcomes may thus often be sensible from a substantive standpoint, 
the murky process by which such outcomes are reached creates uncertainty 
that harms every participant in the patent system because it increases risk, 
encourages litigation, and disrupts business planning.75  The fact that real 
patent scope is determined ex post by judicial interpretation also frustrates 
PTO decisionmaking.76  Since the PTO cannot predict what eventual scope 
a court will give a claim, it may inadvertently issue undeserved claims or 
erroneously reject meritorious claims.77 
Far from creating a determinate and predictable system that secures pa-
tentee rights against the arbitrary whims of judges and PTO bureaucrats,78 
current claim construction doctrine—based on the formalistic unitary inven-
tion framework—creates precisely the indeterminate free-for-all that for-
malism seeks to avoid.  An enormous degree of real judicial discretion is 
coupled with a lack of transparency on how that discretion is exercised. 
                                                                                                                           
73  See, e.g., Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“[T]here is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a 
limitation into the claim from the specification.”). 
74  Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain 
Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1, 2 (2002) (describing judicial uncertainty); Kimber-
ly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 231, 233, 239 (2005) (reporting a 34.5% reversal rate for claim construction).  Another sign that 
claim construction is particularly unpredictable is that experienced district court judges appear to do no 
better in avoiding reversal.  David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008). 
75  See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 18, at 130–44 (showing that many patents are a net disin-
centive for innovation due to unpredictability and litigation costs); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construc-
tion, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1041–42 (2007) 
(“[P]redictability is paramount . . . when participants in the patent system decide whether to invest re-
sources in developing inventions, whether to pursue patent protection, whether to embark upon poten-
tially infringing business ventures, or whether to initiate infringement litigation.”). 
76  See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 536 (2010) (arguing that 
ex post determination allows patentees to game claim construction to their advantage). 
77  See SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
court may interpret claims more broadly than the PTO). 
78  See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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C. Enablement and Written Description 
If claim construction were the only link between the specification and 
the claims, then the unpredictability of the doctrine would be of little long-
term consequence.  This is because patentees control claim language and, 
indeed, have unlimited chances to amend claims after the fact.79  Thus, if a 
court construes a claim in a way that the patentee does not like, such as by 
limiting claim scope to the specification embodiment, the patentee can 
simply return to the PTO and amend the claim language to clarify his in-
tent.80  This is similar to the oft-made point that judicial mistakes in con-
struing statutes are less consequential than mistakes in construing the 
Constitution because Congress can amend the statute to fix the mistake.81  
And the burden for patentees to amend their patent is much lower than the 
burden for Congress to amend a statute.82 
Patentees can often also preemptively resist the importing of limita-
tions from the specification by including very insistent language when in-
itially drafting the claim.83  A good historical example of such preemptive 
resistance is the eighth claim of Samuel Morse’s patent on the telegraph: 
Eighth.  I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of 
machinery, described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of 
my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic cur-
rent, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or print-
ing intelligible characters, letters, or signs at any distances . . . .84 
As the Supreme Court noted when examining this claim, “[i]t is impossible 
to misunderstand the extent of this claim,” and no court could narrow the 
claim down to a specific machine embodiment without appearing flatly un-
reasonable.85  Thus, instead of using claim construction to narrow the claim, 
 
79  See Chiang, supra note 76, at 531–34; Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of 
Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 64 (2004). 
80  See generally Chiang, supra note 76, at 531–34 (explaining the basic mechanisms for amending 
patent claims).  To quickly summarize, the three basic mechanisms to do this are: reissuance, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 251 (2006); reexamination, §§ 301–303; and continuation applications, § 120. 
81  E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989). 
82  Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 98–100 
(1988) (describing the structural tendency towards legislative inaction); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare De-
cisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1481 n.134 (2010) (“[T]he fact that 
Congress can in theory correct the Court’s statutory errors does not mean it is easy to do so as a practical 
matter.”).  
83  See Friedemann Horn, Preparing a Patent Specification for Filing with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, JAT BULLETIN (Japan Ass’n of Translators) (Jan. 2000), 
http://old.jat.org/jtt/bulletin/0001/07.html (“For U.S. specifications, it is customary to end the [specifica-
tion] with a disclaimer, in which the applicant states that the preceding examples are only examples, and 
that there are other ways to work the invention.”). 
84  See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 86 (1853) (emphasis added). 
85  See id. at 112–13. 
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the Court invalidated Morse’s claim entirely.86  Invalidity thus serves as a 
“hard” limit on broad claims when the “soft” limit of narrow claim con-
struction is circumvented. 
Although the Morse Court did not give a clear doctrinal basis for inva-
lidating the claim,87 modern patent law would invalidate the claim under the 
enablement doctrine.88  The enablement doctrine requires a specification to 
teach an ordinary person of skill in the field “how to make and use the full 
scope of the claimed invention.”89  As the Court noted, Morse’s patent could 
not possibly have taught every mode of using electromagnetism to commu-
nicate characters at a distance: 
For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march of 
science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of 
the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or com-
bination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification.  His invention may be less 
complicated—less liable to get out of order—less expensive in construction, 
and in its operation.  But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could 
not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it, without the permission of this 
patentee. . . .  In fine [Morse] claims an exclusive right to use a manner and 
process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore 
could not describe when he obtained his patent.90 
Under this reasoning, the proper scope of a claim is only what Morse had 
described in the patent.  A claim that is any broader would improperly en-
croach upon the contributions of future inventors. 
Viewed within the unitary invention framework, this application of the 
enablement requirement makes perfect sense.  The invention contributed by 
the patentee is only what the specification describes, and describing only 
one telegraph machine should not permit Morse to claim every future ma-
chine that might ever be developed.  Enablement is lacking when the speci-
fication teaches “only one or a few embodiments and do[es] not 
demonstrate with reasonable specificity how to make and use other poten-
tial embodiments across the full scope of the claim.”91  A specification does 
not need to explicitly teach every variation in material and color that a tele-
 
86  Id. at 113. 
87  Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the 
Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 792–93 & n.107 (2008) (noting the difficulty in categoriz-
ing Morse); see Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don’t Know 
Where We Want to Go, We’re Unlikely to Get There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 289, 317 
n.147 (2001). 
88  See A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 IDEA 
491, 514 (2006) (arguing that, in modern theory, Morse would be more appropriately categorized as an 
enablement issue). 
89  In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
90  Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113. 
91  PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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graph machine might have: rather, the reasonable skill of an ordinary arti-
san will allow such minor variations to be considered taught even if not ex-
plicitly mentioned. 92   Of course, such ordinary skill cannot encompass 
technology developed after the filing date.93  The basic and intuitive point is 
that the idea of quid pro quo limits the patentee to what he or she contri-
buted at the time of patent filing.94 
The Supreme Court elaborated on the enablement requirement in The 
Incandescent Lamp Patent case.95  Two inventors, William Sawyer and Al-
bon Man, produced an incandescent lamp with a filament of carbonized pa-
per.96  The lamp was a commercial failure,97 but nonetheless it worked.  
Like all patentees, Sawyer and Man were not content with exclusive rights 
covering only carbonized paper filaments, which would have been very nar-
row and easily avoided.98  Instead, Sawyer and Man abstracted out their in-
vention, stating that it was an incandescent lamp using a “carbonized 
fibrous or textile material” as filament.99  Note here a rhetorical trick: al-
though it is true enough that Sawyer and Man had invented an incandescent 
lamp using a carbonized fibrous or textile material, the legal effect of the 
claim was to cover every incandescent lamp using any carbonized fibrous or 
textile material. 
The Supreme Court invalidated Sawyer and Man’s patent.100  The prob-
lem was that the inventors had “made a broad claim for every fibrous or 
textile material, when in fact an examination of over six thousand vegetable 
growths showed that none of them possessed the peculiar qualities that fit-
ted them” for the purpose of being used as filament.101  Thus, a person tak-
ing Sawyer and Man’s disclosure would not be able to make an 
incandescent lamp made of every fibrous or textile material without “pains-
taking” (i.e., undue) experimentation;102 rather, that person would only be 
able to make an incandescent lamp made of carbonized paper.  The narrow 
scope of Sawyer and Man’s contribution—an incandescent lamp made of 
carbonized paper—did not match the scope of their broad claim. 
The logical conclusion of this framework, what I shall call the “full 
scope” rule, is that the patent’s specification must teach others how to make 
 
92  See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
93  Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
94  See Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
95  The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895). 
96  Id. at 468; U.S. Patent No. 317,676 (filed Jan. 9, 1880). 
97  Incandescent Lamp, 159 U.S. at 471. 
98  In fact, they also filed a claim limited to incandescent lamps using carbonized paper, which was 
not infringed.  Id. at 472. 
99  Id. at 468. 
100  Id. at 477. 
101  Id. at 472. 
102  Id. at 475. 
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and use every embodiment that is covered by a claim.103  Again, the teach-
ing need not be explicit because scientific principles known at time of pa-
tent filing will allow a person of ordinary skill to understand minor changes.  
But, nonetheless, the specification must contain enough detail that the full 
scope of the claim can be built at the time of its filing using only the con-
ventional skill of someone versed in the relevant art.104 
The full scope rule is also reflected in the “written description” re-
quirement, which requires the specification to describe the invention in such 
a way that an ordinary reader can discern “possession” of the claim at the 
time of filing.105  Although phrased as two separate requirements,106 in prac-
tice the enablement and written description requirements are basically coex-
tensive.107  Filing a specification proves possession of what is taught within; 
teaching how to make and use something shows possession of it.108  Like 
enablement, therefore, the written description doctrine is based on the unita-
ry invention principle and the idea of quid pro quo.109  The patentee may on-
ly claim those embodiments to which he shows possession at the time of 
filing the patent because they represent his “invention” and social contribu-
tion.110 
 
103  Merges & Nelson, supra note 34, at 845 (“Under section 112, the disclosure must be sufficient 
to enable someone skilled in the art to make and use all the embodiments of the invention claimed in the 
patent.”). 
104  Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
105  See ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
106  Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
107  See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting 
that the two requirements usually “rise and fall together”).  I should make clear here that they are coex-
tensive only as to the function of policing the reach of claims beyond the specification embodiment.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 306–13.  Obviously, it is possible to describe a specification embodiment 
that does not work, such as a perpetual motion machine, which would fail only the aspect of enablement 
that requires at least one working embodiment, and not written description. 
108  Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, J., con-
curring) (“[T]o enable is to show possession, and to show possession is to enable.”); Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 146–47 (2006) (arguing that enablement should 
be conceptualized as possession); see Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the 
“Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 55, 62–64 (2000) (arguing that no court “has ever articulated a persuasive rationale for distin-
guishing the written description requirement from the enablement requirement”). 
109  See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
110  See, e.g., PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(holding that a specification describing one type of “customer interface”—vending machines—did not 
show possession of other types of interface, such as remote laptop computers); Univ. of Rochester v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he purpose of the written description re-
quirement is to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach 
the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.” (quot-
ing Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
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All of this reasoning makes apparent sense, except that a literal appli-
cation of the full scope rule would invalidate every patent in existence.  
This is because, as Jeffrey Lefstin has pointed out, every patent claim cov-
ers an infinite array of embodiments, which cannot all be taught by the spe-
cification.111  A claim by default covers every material, size, and added part, 
unless such variations are expressly disclaimed.112  For example, the claims 
of the Wright brothers’ patent on the airplane recited the basic structure of 
an airplane without specifying its material, size, or power source.113  By de-
fault, therefore, the claim covered every type of material, every size of air-
plane, and every added part such as later-developed engines.  In March 
1903, when the patent was filed, however, the Wright brothers had only 
wood for construction, and they did not have any engine at all.114  The claim 
thus covers a large number of later-developed embodiments—aluminum 
planes, propeller planes, jet planes—that the Wright brothers did not and 
could not teach in their specification at the time it was filed.115  
Not only is it impossible for a specification to teach how to build every 
embodiment covered by a claim, 116  almost everybody would agree that 
 
111   Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008). 
112  A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“It is fundamental that 
one cannot avoid infringement merely by adding elements . . . .”); see supra text accompanying note 30.  
113  U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (filed Mar. 23, 1903).  The key claim recited: 
In a flying-machine, the combination, with an aeroplane, and means for simultaneously moving 
the lateral portions thereof into different angular relations to the normal plane of the body of the 
aeroplane and to each other, so as to present to the atmosphere different angles of incidence, of a 
vertical rudder, and means whereby said rudder is caused to present to the wind that side thereof 
nearest the side of the aeroplane having the smaller angle of incidence and offering the least resis-
tance to the atmosphere, substantially as described.  
Id. at col. 6 ll. 62–74. 
114  See John F. Hanieski, The Airplane as an Economic Variable: Aspects of Technological Change 
in Aeronautics, 1903–1955, 14 TECH. & CULTURE 535, 543–44 (1973) (noting that the Wright brothers’ 
twelve-horsepower engine was first used in flight in December 1903). 
115  See id. at 544 (“The following thirty-five years saw the aircraft engine increase dramatically in 
its power.”); see also Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising 
Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 516–20 
(2008) (describing the coverage of open claims over after-arising technology); Lefstin, supra note 111, 
at 1170 (giving example of a standard claim to a chair that, by its openness, covers futuristic chairs made 
of neutronium). 
116  One might suggest that enablement of an accused product should be assessed instead at the time 
of infringement.  Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009); see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) 
(holding that equivalency is assessed at time of infringement).  But this would be a useless test: the per-
son of skill in the art is deemed to have perfect knowledge of everything public, In re Winslow, 
365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966), which would include the accused product if assessed at the time 
of infringement.  Even without this imputed knowledge, the accused infringer would presumably be a 
person of ordinary skill in the art, and thus the very fact of infringement would show that creating the 
accused product was within the skill of an ordinary person in the art.  Assessing enablement at the time 
of infringement would mean that an accused product was always enabled.  
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claim coverage should reach some of the variations that the specification 
cannot teach.117  The Wright brothers in 1903 could not have built even 
World War I fighter planes, which stayed in the air much longer than their 
unpowered wooden glider,118 let alone a modern jet.  Yet we are still even 
today relying on the flight control principles that they devised,119 so their 
tremendous social contribution calls for a large reward.120  More generally, 
incremental changes in technology will quickly create improved embodi-
ments that the original inventor could not possibly have built but which still 
rely on many of the same ideas and principles of operation.121  If patent 
scope is limited to those embodiments that the patentee could build at the 
time of filing (and thus teach in the specification), then every patent be-
comes worthless practically from the moment it is issued.  A functioning 
patent system requires a different approach, one that allows some degree of 
coverage for later-developed technologies that are not fully enabled by the 
patentee’s specification. 
Acknowledging this reality, a second line of cases holds that teaching a 
single working embodiment satisfies the enablement and written description 
requirements.122  I shall call this the “one-embodiment-enables-everything” 
rule.  For example, in Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc.,123 the 
Federal Circuit held that “[t]he enablement requirement is met if the de-
 
117  Note that the two formulations are equivalent.  To require that the specification teach all claimed 
embodiments is to limit claims to the embodiments taught by the specification.  The full scope rule can 
be described as “claim coverage equals specification teaching” or vice versa. 
118  See G.D. Padfield & B. Lawrence, The Birth of Flight Control: An Engineering Analysis of the 
Wright Brothers’ 1902 Glider, 107 AERONAUTICAL J. 697, 717 (2003) (“[A]fter 1908 the rate of 
progress in aviation was quite startling; progress which, in many ways, would leave the Wright brothers 
behind . . . .”). 
119   DAVID B. THURSTON, THE WORLD’S MOST SIGNIFICANT AND MAGNIFICENT AIRCRAFT 23 
(2000) (“We use the rudder in similar fashion today [as the Wright brothers].”). 
120  See Padfield & Lawrence, supra note 118, at 698 (“[T]heir solution to three-axis control, linking 
roll and yaw control to mitigate the powerful adverse yaw effects, was one of ‘the’ critical break-
throughs in the history of aviation and aeronautical engineering.”). 
121  See Hanieski, supra note 114, at 538 (noting that “Louis Bleriot retained the Wright system of 
control but abandoned their [airplane] design” for his crossing of the English Channel in 1909); see also 
Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889) (“[A]ll subsequent machines which 
employ substantially the same means to accomplish the same result are infringements, although the sub-
sequent machine may contain improvements . . . .”). 
122  Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880) (requiring “a description of the process and of 
one practical mode in which it may be applied”); see Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 
1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that a claim is not invalid even if it “reads on another embodiment 
of the invention which is inadequately disclosed”); see also Laryngeal Mask Co. v. Ambu A/S, 618 F.3d 
1367, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing grant of summary judgment that claim lacked written de-
scription when specification did not describe accused product). 
123  429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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scription enables any mode of making and using the invention.”124  It further 
explained: 
Enablement does not require the inventor to foresee every means of imple-
menting an invention at pains of losing his patent franchise.  Were it other-
wise, claimed inventions would not include improved modes of practicing 
those inventions.  Such narrow patent rights would rapidly become worthless 
as new modes of practicing the invention developed, and the inventor would 
lose the benefit of the patent bargain.125 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has specifically held that a competitor’s 
product can be infringing without being enabled by the patentee’s specifica-
tion.126  This conclusion follows from the doctrine that patentees should be 
able to cover new variants and improvements.127  But it poses a contradic-
tion for the quid pro quo theory of patents and the unitary invention prin-
ciple.  After all, if the patent specification should enable the full scope of 
the claim and a product must fall within the claim to infringe, then a logical 
application of the unitary invention framework would require enabling 
every infringing product.  The fact that this is not required exposes the un-
acceptable policy consequences of strictly following the full scope rule in 
all cases. 
One way that courts have attempted to reconcile these two lines of cas-
es is to hold that later-developed technology need not be enabled,128 but all 
other claimed embodiments must be.129  This, however, is simply a restate-
ment of the “one-embodiment-enables-everything” rule in disguise.  To see 
why, consider that everything in the universe fits into one of three temporal 
categories: (1) preexisting technology or prior art, (2) the embodiments 
taught by the patentee at filing, or (3) later-developed technology.130  Cate-
gory 1 is unpatentable anyway on novelty grounds.131  Category 2 is by de-
finition what has been enabled by the patentee.  If category 3 need not be 
 
124  Id. at 1071 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
125  Id. 
126  Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The dispositive 
question of enablement does not turn on whether the accused product is enabled.”). 
127  Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889). 
128  Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The law does not ex-
pect an applicant to disclose knowledge invented or developed after the filing date.”); In re Hogan, 
559 F.2d 595, 605–06 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
129  See Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1254 (holding that nascent technology must be enabled with specific 
disclosure). 
130  See Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1086 
(2009) (distinguishing prior art doctrines that scope over pre-filing knowledge from enablement and 
written description, which limit scope “prospectively”). 
131  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
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taught but can still be claimed,132 then all that is required for a valid claim is 
for something to fall within category 2. Therefore, one working embodi-
ment would allow for unlimited claiming.  Unsurprisingly, given that this 
doctrine simply restates the one-embodiment-enables-everything rule in dif-
ferent words, it is contradicted by numerous other cases requiring the full 
claim scope—including later-developed technology—to be taught.133 
This analysis reveals two problems.  First, the cases are irreconcila-
ble.134  The full-scope line of cases requires every claimed embodiment to 
be taught, and the one-embodiment-enables-everything line of cases re-
quires only one claimed embodiment to be taught.  A citation to one or the 
other can justify any outcome.135  Litigants are left to wonder whether a pa-
tent that discloses one or a few working embodiments and claims many 
others—that is, practically every patent—is valid.136  Second, each line of 
cases has serious defects that are responsible for the contrary line. 
Teaching every claimed embodiment is impossible, and such a re-
quirement would invalidate every patent.  At the very least, it would restrict 
patent scope to slavish replication of disclosed embodiments and thereby 
cripple patent incentives since pirates could then escape infringement by 
simply making insignificant changes using post-filing technology.  On the 
other hand, to say that teaching one working embodiment satisfies the 
enablement requirement leaves no limit on patent scope.  After creating one 
working embodiment, a patentee could then claim “everything new and 
nonobvious in the universe,” without an obvious doctrine to strike that 
claim down.137  A less extreme version of this tactic, though one with the 
same sense of unfairness, is precisely what Samuel Morse and Sawyer and 
Man tried—claiming very general categories, such as all uses of electro-
 
132  See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our case 
law allows for after-arising technology to be captured within the literal scope of valid claims that are 
drafted broadly enough.”). 
133  See, e.g., The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 472–74 (1895) (finding Sawyer and 
Man’s patent invalid due to its failure to teach Edison’s later-developed bamboo filament); Auto. Techs. 
Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding invalidity due to fail-
ure to teach later-developed electronic sensor). 
134  See generally Chao, supra note 20, ¶¶ 50–52 (discussing the Federal Circuit split). 
135  Of course, if no working embodiment is disclosed, everyone can agree that the patent is invalid 
because it has no utility.  See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966). 
136  See Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[A]n issue common to many patent disputes [is] claims 
that are broader than the disclosed embodiments.”). 
137  Such a claim would fail the PTO’s procedural requirements for claim form.  Ex parte Fressola, 
27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1612 (B.P.A.I. 1993).  However, these procedural requirements have never been 
judicially endorsed.  See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997) 
(stating that the PTO’s modern claiming practice “is not of statutory origin” and abandonment of prior 
forms “may be overstated”). 
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magnetism or all fibrous and textile materials.138  Thus, under current doc-
trine, there is neither a predictable rule for determining patent scope nor 
even a theoretical framework for how such a rule might be devised.  The 
rules that we do have ultimately create more confusion than clarity because 
they directly contradict each other. 
II. INVENTION IN MULTIPLE LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION 
A better way to understand the patent scope problem is to consider the 
specification and the claim separately by discarding the idea that these two 
distinct concepts describe a unitary invention.139  The specification describes 
an embodiment, and the claim captures an idea.  Rather than thinking of 
these two components of a patent as different paths to the same conclu-
sion,140 it is better to understand that they represent fundamentally different 
concepts. 
A. Differentiating the Concepts of Invention 
1. Invention as a Specification Embodiment.—Section 112 of the pa-
tent statute states that the “specification shall contain a written description 
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art . . . to make and use the same.”141  Here, when the statute uses the 
word “invention,” it requires a tangible and working embodiment, such as a 
physical process or a machine.  It is not possible to “make” intangible ideas, 
only embodiments.142  Thus, an invention in the specification must be “em-
bodied . . . in some distinct form.”143  This is also consistent with § 101’s 
requirement that patentable inventions be a tangible “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter.”144 
 
138  See supra text accompanying notes 95–102. 
139  EMERSON STRINGHAM, DOUBLE PATENTING 209 (1933) (“This primitive confusion of ‘inven-
tion’ in the sense of physical embodiment with ‘invention’ in the sense of definition of the patenta-
ble . . . survives to the present day, not only in the courts, but among some examiners in the Patent 
Office.”). 
140  See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922, n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]hile the role of the claims is to give public notice of the subject matter that is protected, the role of 
the specification is to teach, both what the invention is (written description) and how to make and use it 
(enablement).”); SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121, n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(en banc) (“Specifications teach.  Claims claim.”). 
141  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
142  Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 331, 333 (1983) (“Ideas are 
never patentable.  Only an embodiment of an idea, i.e., an invention, may be patented.”). 
143  Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 552 (1870). 
144  See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that a process is only patenta-
ble if it “is embodied in, operates on, transforms, or otherwise involves” a product); In re Nuijten, 
500 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that tangibility is required for products to be patentable).  
 
105:1097  (2011) The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law 
 1119
2. Invention as a Claimed Idea.—Although the law requires the in-
vention in the specification to be embodied in distinct form, it equally re-
cognizes that substance, not form, defines patent protection. 145   In 
ascertaining patent scope, the claim should articulate the “principle” of the 
underlying the patent.146  In other words, claims define an idea, and the 
claimed idea defines the scope of a patent.  In this second sense, “inven-
tion” refers to an intangible idea.147 
Although I refer to this sense of invention as an idea, it is important to 
clarify the meaning of “idea” that is intended.  I am not referring to ideas in 
the sense of philosophical thought—in all cases a physical embodiment is 
required for infringement.148  Instead, the point is that patent coverage is 
more abstract than any single embodiment, covering a class of embodi-
ments that share only some operating principle or functional idea.  For ex-
ample, the original transistor embodiment created by Bell Laboratories was 
an “ungainly table-top experiment,” bearing little physical resemblance to 
modern micro-transistor embodiments that are mere nanometers across.149  
But both the table-top transistor and the micro-transistor share the operating 
principles inherent to all transistors in using semiconductor material to am-
plify and switch electronic signals.  At an even higher level of abstraction, a 
modern transistor bears even less physical resemblance to a vacuum tube, 
but the two embodiments still share the principle of functioning as electrical 
switches.  A claim directed to “all electrical switches” is not directed to one 
particular tangible thing but is instead directed to an abstraction, and this 
claimed idea is reflected in an infinitely large (and continually growing) 
                                                                                                                           
But cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“The machine-or-
transformation test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating . . . inventions grounded in a phys-
ical or other tangible form.  But there are reasons to doubt whether the test should be the sole criterion 
for determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age.”). 
145  See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1853) (“[I]t is the duty of courts and 
juries to look through the form for the substance of the invention—for that which entitled the inventor to 
his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
146  See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 30, at 27 (“For purposes of the patent law, an invention is on-
ly the concept or principle that is articulated in the patent claim.”). 
147  Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 434 (1896) (“In every case the idea conceived is the inven-
tion.”); see Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“The primary meaning of the word ‘in-
vention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a physical 
embodiment of that idea.”); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“Unlike a patent, a copy-
right gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—
not the idea itself.”). 
148  See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 979 (holding that a pure mental process is not patentable); Da-
tamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a claim to 
an “aesthetically pleasing” appearance was invalid because it was impossible to objectively determine 
infringement); see also Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Prob-
lem of Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 759, 799 (arguing for a “constructive nonvoli-
tion” defense to infringement by mental processes). 
149  MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 30, at 27. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1120 
class of tangible things that otherwise often bear little resemblance to each 
other. 
3. Differences in Concept, Not Just in Approach.—Although the dif-
ferences between an idea and embodiment are well known, courts and 
commentators have elided the differences between them using the rhetoric 
of a unitary “invention,” in which the specification and claim are supposed 
to be describing different facets of the same thing.150  When forced to clarify 
what an “invention” really is, however, leading authorities take directly 
contradictory approaches. 
Chief Judge Howard Markey of the Federal Circuit, one of the preemi-
nent judges of patent law, has characterized an “invention” as the embodi-
ment described by a specification.  According to Chief Judge Markey, 
“Ideas are never patentable.  Only an embodiment of an idea, i.e., an inven-
tion, may be patented.”151  Moreover, “‘idea’” is a “mud word” that “ap-
pears nowhere in the statute, which speaks only of ‘invention.’”152  Some 
Supreme Court precedent supports the view of invention as embodiment,153 
as does the statute that defines patentable inventions as tangible machines, 
products, and processes154 that can be made and used.155 
On the other side, Judge Giles Rich of the Federal Circuit, another 
eminent judge who wrote much of the 1952 Patent Act, has opined that an 
“invention” is an abstract idea.  According to Judge Rich, an invention is 
“an incorporeal, intangible abstraction in the nature of a product of the 
mind.”156  An embodiment is “[p]opularly but inaccurately called ‘inven-
tion.’”157  This view, too, has support in Supreme Court precedent, which 
states that “[t]he primary meaning of the word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act 
unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a physical 
embodiment of that idea.”158 
Taken to their extreme, the two definitions for “invention” are irrecon-
cilable.  An invention cannot be both an intangible idea and a tangible thing 
 
150  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (“What is 
claimed by the patent application must be the same as what is disclosed in the specification . . . .”). 
151  Markey, supra note 142, at 333. 
152  Id. 
153  Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 552 (1870). 
154  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
155  35 U.S.C. § 112. 
156  Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws—Part II, 
24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 159, 171 (1942). 
157  Id. at 172. 
158  Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998); see Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 434 
(1896) (“In every case the idea conceived is the invention.”). 
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at the same time.159  But “invention” can mean different things in different 
contexts.  When speaking about the specification disclosure, the statute uses 
“invention” to denote the patentee’s tangible creation, which must be novel 
and useful and must be precisely described so that it can be built.  When 
speaking about claims and infringement, the statute uses “invention” to de-
note an idea that others may not utilize, and a third party infringes the pa-
tent by using the same idea even if it is embodied in a different form than 
the specification embodiment. 
One counterargument to this need for conceptual differentiation is that 
the invention being described by a specification can also be considered an 
idea because patentees will often include a statement of the operating prin-
ciples and inventive ideas in the specification as well as in the claim.  But 
whether patentees perform this exercise in redundancy is irrelevant; I am 
not resting my assertion that the specification describes an embodiment on 
whether a particular patent specification explicitly describes the inventive 
idea.  Rather, the premise of my argument is that the patent statute itself 
conceptualizes the invention of the specification as an embodiment when it 
states that the specification must describe a “process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter”160 in sufficient detail that it can be “ma[de] 
and use[d].”161  Even when a patentee explicitly describes ideas in the speci-
fication description in addition to an embodiment, they cannot supersede 
the statutory definition of what the specification invention is.  Because the 
specification invention is defined to be an embodiment, two options remain: 
either the claimed invention is also conceptualized as an embodiment, 
which would produce unacceptable policy results,162 or we must accept that 
the specification and claims reflect different conceptions of what an inven-
tion is. 
So far, all I have provided is a simple description of the reality of pa-
tent practice, which every practitioner at some level intuitively under-
stands.163  But if “invention” means different things in different contexts—if 
idea and embodiment are not the same thing described in different ways—
then the unitary invention framework is invalid.  This is because every em-
bodiment contains many ideas at different levels of abstraction.  There is no 
automatic correlation between embodiment (i.e., contribution) and idea 
(i.e., monopoly scope).  Defining the idea-invention by conflating it with 
 
159  See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 609, 645 (2009) (arguing that “abstraction is the very antithesis of the precision required by the 
disclosure provisions of the Patent Act”). 
160  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
161  35 U.S.C. § 112. 
162  See supra text accompanying notes 117–21. 
163  See generally RONALD D. SLUSKY, INVENTION ANALYSIS AND CLAIMING: A PATENT LAWYER’S 
GUIDE 5 (2007) (“[A]n invention is an abstraction.”). 
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the embodiment-invention is a comparison of apples to oranges, more mis-
leading than helpful.164 
B. Claiming Ideas at Multiple Levels of Abstraction 
The two differing concepts of “invention” create a problem for defin-
ing patent scope.  For any specification embodiment, an infinite array of 
ideas are equally apt for a claim.  To return to an earlier example, consider 
the invention of a radiation machine that cures AIDS.165  The invention can 
be claimed as any of the following: 
1. “A cure for AIDS,” covering all cures that might ever be devised. 
2. “A cure for AIDS using radiation,” covering all cures using any type of 
radiation but not other methods. 
3. “A cure for AIDS using X-radiation,” thereby excluding methods using 
other types of radiation. 
4. “A cure for AIDS using X-radiation specifically by using the exact make 
and model of the radiation machine in the specification.” 
Every level of abstraction describes something that is new, useful, and non-
obvious.  Thus, the standard criteria of patentability provide no guidance 
regarding which level of abstraction is proper for patent protection.166  But a 
patent covering all cures for AIDS is obviously different from a patent cov-
ering only one particular radiation machine. 
The level of abstraction corresponds directly to the scope of a claim.  
The more abstract a claimed idea, the broader the resulting patent coverage.  
In this sense, protecting a single concrete embodiment is just the narrowest, 
most extreme point on a spectrum of possible levels of abstraction. 
FIGURE 1: SPECTRUM OF LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION 
 
 
164  STRINGHAM, supra note 139, at 209 (“In patent law there is no possibility of clear thinking until 
it is understood that an ‘invention’ as protected . . . is an abstraction, an idea of means.”). 
165  See supra Introduction. 
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Within the spectrum of abstractions, each description is as equally ac-
curate as any other.  As a matter of formalist principle, there is almost no 
limit on how far one can move up or down the abstractions ladder.167  Be-
tween claiming every last detail of the specification embodiment and omit-
ting all details and claiming a fundamental principle, there is no legally 
principled limit.  The criteria of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness 
provide no definitive answer.  Nor do enablement and written description 
provide an answer: these two related doctrines are both internally contradic-
tory and thus provide no coherent principle at all.168 
Nonetheless, courts must and do draw lines on the permissible level of 
abstraction.  The lines, however, are drawn silently, without informing the 
public and litigants of any coherent principle.  Because courts have not 
openly appreciated the abstractions problem or recognized this inherent 
line-drawing choice, the formal doctrine does nothing to answer how the 
choice is made. 
One obvious response to this analysis is that courts usually reach sens-
ible results anyway.  For example, even though the one-embodiment-
enables-them-all line of cases would allow it, a court almost certainly will 
not permit a patent that covers all cures for AIDS.  Nor would a court nar-
rowly reward the creator of a radiation machine that cures AIDS with only 
the precise machine down to the last nut, bolt, or paint color even though 
that is the logical conclusion of the full-scope line of cases.  The mere fact 
that a doctrine permits logical absurdities does not mean that courts will ac-
tually reach absurd results.169  Rather, courts will usually manipulate the 
conflicting case law to reach sensible outcomes.170 
The fact that litigated outcomes are usually sensible, however, does not 
diminish the importance of accurately recognizing the means used to reach 
them.  A patent system that promises inventors a sensible reward based on 
plenary judicial discretion is one that is radically different in conception 
than what our current system purports to be. This analysis highlights the 
irony that patent law, once stripped of its formalist gloss, actually operates 
on almost plenary judicial discretion   
Moreover, it is important to point out that outcomes are largely sensi-
ble precisely because there is judicial discretion.  Following either absolut-
ist rule—allowing one embodiment to enable everything or requiring every 
 
167  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 14 (arguing that there is no right level of abstraction when con-
struing claim limitations).   
168  See supra Part I.C. 
169  Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950) (arguing that, because 
the canons of statutory construction contradict each other, decisions are made according to “[t]he good 
sense of the situation”). 
170  Kennedy, supra note 60, at 1700. 
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claimed embodiment to be enabled—would lead to absurd results.  Thus, 
judges are required to engage in the delicate and policy-laden line-drawing 
task of finding the “right” level of abstraction for a particular patent.  If me-
chanical decisionmaking truly reigned in patent law, then absurd results 
would abound. 
The fact that courts pick and choose among conflicting case law to 
reach sensible outcomes would be much less problematic if judges articu-
lated the real bases for reaching these decisions.  But this is hardly possible 
while patent law continues to be dominated by the fiction that patent re-
wards should be rigidly and automatically matched to the “invention” and 
by rhetoric disparaging the exercise of judicial discretion as tantamount to 
decisionmaking by whim.171  Indeed, the rhetoric of mechanical formalism 
holds such sway over patent jurisprudence that the Federal Circuit has not 
even acknowledged the conflict between the full-scope and the one-
embodiment-enables-them-all lines of cases.172  By remaining entirely silent 
about how the choice among conflicting cases is made—i.e., by remaining 
silent about the real decisionmaking process—courts create confusion and 
unpredictability for everyone.173  Even if courts ultimately reach the right 
results most of the time, masking the true decisionmaking process behind 
formalist rhetoric makes it more difficult to resolve the many cases that are 
never litigated.  This uncertainty ultimately causes additional litigation and 
expense.  The levels of abstraction problem illuminates the reality of patent 
scope determinations and reveals the necessity of judicial line-drawing.  
This analysis sheds much light on the current confusion surrounding issues 
of patent scope. 
C. Understanding the Claim Construction Debate 
Once we understand that claimed ideas exist on multiple levels of ab-
straction, the conflicts in claim construction are more accurately viewed as 
disagreements over policy, not over textual methods. 
1. Debunking the Linguistic Vagueness Rationale.—Claim construc-
tion is commonly framed as a debate between two interpretative schools: 
textualists, who look primarily to dictionaries for the meaning of claim lan-
guage, and contextualists, who look primarily to the specification embodi-
 
171  See supra text accompanying note 58. 
172  See Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (re-
jecting argument that there is a “dichotomy in our case law”). 
173  See Bender, supra note 18, at 202–17; William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to 
Markman: A Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55, 
67 (1999); Moore, supra note 74, at 231 (noting a concern among “the bench and bar” that “de novo re-
view of district court claim construction decisions and lack of guidance have caused considerable unpre-
dictability” (footnote omitted)). 
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ment for context. 174   Thus, textualists give greater weight to the canon 
against importing limitations from the specification whereas contextualists 
give greater weight to the canon that claims must be interpreted in light of 
the specification.  Common to both schools, however, is a core framework: 
both agree that claim construction is a formalist interpretive exercise whose 
goal is to neutrally ascertain the meaning of claim language.175  The nomin-
al enemy of both schools remains the judge who twists text to reach a par-
ticular outcome.176  
The formalist framework characterizes the claim construction problem 
as one of linguistic vagueness.177  Although the point is somewhat too ob-
vious to be frequently stated, the very fact that the court believes that a dis-
pute falls within the rubric of claim construction implies that the court 
regards the claim language as unclear and that this lack of linguistic clarity 
is the source of the legal dispute.178  When the court in Kinetic Concepts 
treated the dispute—the patentee claiming “wound” treatments generically 
but the specification disclosing only skin wounds—as one of claim con-
struction, it implicitly asserted that the problem was that the claim was lin-
guistically vague.  Similarly, in Phillips v. AWH Corp.,179 when the en banc 
Federal Circuit struggled with whether to narrow down a generic-sounding 
claim to all “internal steel baffles”180 to cover only steel plates that lie with-
in the specific range of angles that were disclosed in the specification, the 
implicit predicate assertion was that the claim language was unclear.  To 
regard such common nontechnical terms such as “wound” and “baffle” as 
linguistically uncertain is in many ways strange to the layperson, yet it is so 
common in patent law that this strangeness is no longer noted.  The reason 
for this curious conception of vagueness is the unitary invention theory.  If 
we understand the specification and the claim as directed to a single inven-
tion, then the linguistic uncertainty makes sense: although the specification 
 
174  See Nard, supra note 19, at 4 (characterizing the two schools as “hypertextualism” and “prag-
matic textualism”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empiri-
cal Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2004) (describing the two 
schools as “procedural” versus “holistic”). 
175  Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language: in order 
to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.”). 
176  SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
177  See, e.g., Osenga, supra note 19, at 84 (arguing for greater use of linguistic techniques in claim 
construction). 
178  Burk & Lemley, supra note 50, at 1760 (“The process of claim construction itself presumes that 
the words of the claims are insufficiently precise to delineate those boundaries.”); see U.S. Surgical 
Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolu-
tion of disputed meanings and technical scope . . . .”). 
179  415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
180  Id. at 1324.  An “internal steel baffle” in this context is an internal steel plate.  The patent per-
tains to prison walls where the primary purpose of internal steel plates is to deflect bullets.  Id. at 1310. 
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and the claim are supposed to describe the same thing, one describes a gen-
eral category of all wounds, all baffles, all airplanes, or all cures for AIDS, 
and the other describes only a single embodiment of those things.  The pa-
tent document thus appears to be contradicting itself.  On this understanding 
of the patent document and the nature of an invention, every patent is lin-
guistically unclear. 
The levels of abstraction framework brings clarity to what is really 
going on in the current claim construction debate.  First, the real problem is 
rarely linguistic ambiguity or vagueness.  As the drafter of patent claim lan-
guage, of course the patentee prefers to cover all wounds, baffles of all an-
gles, and as many embodiments and variants as the law will allow.181  There 
is nothing ambiguous, vague, incoherent, or even surprising about the pa-
tentee trying to move up the abstraction ladder to gain more scope for the 
claim even though the specification has only one embodiment.  The only 
reason that courts would think so is because of the unitary invention prin-
ciple treating the claim and the specification as a single “invention.”  In 
other words, the root of the problem that courts are perceiving is not that the 
patent document is linguistically uncertain but rather that the unitary inven-
tion theory is not true and thus the specification and claims are not describ-
ing the same thing.  Courts that forcibly mesh the two together will 
obviously become confused, but the confusion is not a result of uncertainty 
in the claim language or textual defects of the patent document.  A court 
that attempts to deem oranges and apples as the same thing will also be-
come confused when it discovers they are not. 
Second, courts that treat the claim construction problem as one of lin-
guistic vagueness often confuse vagueness with abstraction, as do many 
commentators.182  What courts then do with the supposedly “vague” claim is 
to interpret it by reference to the specification embodiment and make the 
claim narrower.183  But this relies on a mistaken diagnosis of the problem.  
 
181  Faber, supra note 27, § 10:1.1 (“[C]overage should be as broad as possible.”).  The qualification 
of “as the law will allow” is important.  A patentee would prefer a narrow claim construction if the 
broad construction would invalidate the patent, and patentees often change their tune when later-
discovered information creates such a threat.  See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent 
Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 117 (2005).  But ex post shifts in patentee claim interpretation 
preference are obviously disingenuous.  See Chiang, supra note 76, at 549–51 (discussing incentive 
problems created by modifying scope in response to post-filing information). 
182  See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 18, at 199–200 (attributing the problem of uncertainty to 
abstract claims); Jay Dratler, Jr., Fixing Our Broken Patent System, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
47, 56 (2010) (arguing “because abstractions are inherently fuzzier than real things, their uncertain defi-
nition complicates every aspect of our patent system”). 
183  See, e.g., Edward Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1331–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(construing the claim term “graft,” in a surgical device, to require wires and also that the wires be malle-
able because these were features of the specification embodiment). 
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Narrowing scope directly reduces abstraction,184 but it does not predictably 
reduce vagueness. 
Examples will help clarify the distinction between vagueness and ab-
straction.  An idea is vague if its own boundaries are fuzzy,185 creating a 
high number of borderline cases.  On the other hand, an idea is abstract if it 
lacks specific context.186  The question, “Is Mr. Smith tall?” is vague, but it 
is not abstract.  Whether Mr. Smith is “tall” is difficult to answer, even if 
we know Mr. Smith is 5’11”, because there is no bright-line height cut-off 
for what is considered tall, and 5’11” is a borderline case.  But the question 
is not abstract because it refers to one specific person and the specific 
attribute of his height. 
In contrast, the idea of a prime number (a number divisible only by it-
self and one) is abstract but not vague.  The idea is abstract because prime 
numbers can be used in many contexts.187  Its abstractness comes from spe-
cifying no particular application.  But it is extremely straightforward to de-
termine whether a number is a prime number, and thus the idea is not 
vague. 
When courts find broad claims “vague,” they are often mistaking va-
gueness for abstraction.  A classic example of this mistake is the Phillips 
case.188  The question in Phillips was whether the term “baffle” (used in 
prison walls) meant “baffles at any angle” or “baffles at angles other than 
90 degrees.”  The Federal Circuit obviously considered the term vague 
since it took the case en banc and three judges dissented.189  But in truth, al-
though “baffles at any angle” is more abstract than “baffles at angles other 
than 90 degrees,” both are equally vague.  It is as easy to determine whether 
something is a baffle at any angle as it is to determine whether something is 
a baffle at an angle other than 90 degrees.  It is simply that “baffles at any 
angle” does not specify any particular angle or range of angles and is thus 
more abstract.  Indeed, it is slightly easier to determine whether something 
 
184  See supra Part II.B. 
185  See ISRAEL SCHEFFLER, BEYOND THE LETTER: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO AMBIGUITY, 
VAGUENESS AND METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE 40–43 (1979) (comparing the concepts of vagueness and 
generality). 
186  See id. 
187  Prime numbers are used in numerous contexts such as encryption technology.  See, e.g., ALFRED 
J. MENEZES,  PAUL C. VAN OORSCHOT  &  SCOTT A. VANSTONE, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 286 (1997).  Under a doctrine that is distinct from claim construction and enablement, 
extremely abstract claims such as those on prime numbers are not allowed.  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63 (1972) (claim on converting binary numbers not permitted). 
188  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  
189  Id. at 1328–35 (dissents of Judges Newman, Mayer, and Lourie). 
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is a baffle at any angle, since we avoid disputes about whether 89.99999 
degrees is close enough.190 
This mistake also arose in Kinetic Concepts, which dealt with whether 
the term “wound” really meant “skin wound.”191  There is no extraordinary 
vagueness problem in the word “wound” that is clarified by specifying that 
the wound must occur on the skin.  It is as easy to determine whether some-
thing is a wound anywhere as it is to determine whether something is a 
wound on the skin.  As with the baffle example, the primary effect of im-
porting the limitation of skin is not to reduce uncertainty but rather to re-
duce coverage.  Indeed, there may be an increase in the relative degree of 
uncertainty because, in addition to questions about what constitutes a 
wound, we must now also consider questions about whether something con-
stitutes skin (such as the membranes on the inside of the mouth), as well as 
cases where it is uncertain whether something is a wound and uncertain 
whether it is on the skin (e.g., a scratch inside the mouth).  The following 
diagram illustrates the effect: 
FIGURE 2: THE EFFECT OF IMPORTING LIMITATIONS 
 
 
190  These “construction of the construction” disputes are common.  See, e.g., SafeTCare Mfg., Inc. 
v. Tele-Made, Inc., 497 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Leapfrog Enters. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 
1157, 1159–60 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
191  Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1018–19 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
see also Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (in-
terpreting the “body” of a syringe to require a one-piece structure). 
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In Figure 2, without the added limitation of skin, the zone of certain in-
fringement would be represented by the union of areas 1, 2, and 5.  The 
zone of uncertain potential infringement would be represented by the union 
of zones 3, 4, and 6.  Finally, the zone of certain noninfringement would be 
represented by zone 7. 
The primary effect of importing the limitation of skin is to reduce the 
abstractness of the claim and thus the scope of coverage.  This can be seen 
by the fact that the zone of certain infringement has been reduced dramati-
cally to only zone 1 whereas the zone of certain noninfringement has been 
expanded dramatically to the union of zones 5, 6, and 7.  Thus, the accused 
product that fell within the zone of uncertain potential infringement before 
now falls in the zone of definite noninfringement.  The claim has been 
made superficially more determinate for a single case and a single product, 
which may explain why judges believe that narrowing scope reduces va-
gueness.  But, of course, the ease of resolving one single case is not some-
thing that the legal system as a whole is particularly concerned about when 
devising rules of general application.192 
What happens to the zone of uncertainty more generally?  The zone of 
uncertainty changes from the union of zones 3, 4, and 6 to the union of 
zones 2, 3, and 4.  Whether the absolute number of uncertain cases increas-
es or decreases depends on whether zone 2 or zone 6 was larger.  In Figure 
2, zone 6 is larger than zone 2, so the absolute number of borderline cases 
has decreased, but the diagram could easily be changed to produce the op-
posite outcome.  Also, note that the inquiry for cases falling within zone 3 
has become more difficult because now there is uncertainty with respect to 
the meanings of both “wound” and “skin.”  Finally, note that the number of 
uncertain cases has dramatically increased relative to the number of poten-
tial and definite infringements.  This relativistic measure of uncertainty is 
usually how vagueness is conceived.  Saying someone is tall or short would 
be considered vague because there are many borderline cases when consi-
dered relative to the known ranges of human height.  But if considered from 
an absolute perspective—that is, considering every height from zero to in-
finity—then all human heights are within a very narrow band. 
The bottom line is that, whether considered from an absolute or relati-
vistic perspective, the scope of a claim has no logical connection to its lin-
guistic vagueness.  Although it is true enough that, at the extreme, a claim 
with no scope also has no vagueness and reducing abstraction enough will 
eventually reduce the absolute number of borderline cases, this logical 
 
192  See Lefstin, supra note 75, at 1040–42 (arguing that predictability before litigation is more im-
portant than predictability after a district court trial). 
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sleight of hand does little to further the analysis.193  An infinitely abstract 
claim with infinite scope has no borderline cases, either, because it would 
cover everything.  But no one thinks of increasing scope as a method of re-
ducing vagueness.  Reducing scope to solve a supposed vagueness problem 
is not any more logical, and thus courts that narrow patent scope to cure 
“vagueness” are fundamentally misdiagnosing the problem. 
The confusion of abstraction for vagueness explains why courts keep 
attempting to resolve claim construction disputes using formal textual me-
thods and yet keep discovering that such textual methods do not work.  
Problems of vagueness can be resolved by formalist textual methods be-
cause vagueness has no normative dimension: all else being equal, clearer is 
better when it comes to property boundaries like claims.194  In contrast, ab-
straction, which directly translates into scope, has a normative dimension 
that formalist textual methods will never answer—namely, how much scope 
is desirable.  As the Kinetic Concepts court frankly acknowledged, the 
claim at issue had to be narrowed because it would otherwise “expand the 
scope of the claims far beyond anything described in the specification.”195  
No amount of textual interpretation will tell us how much broader the claim 
should be compared to the specification embodiment or how far claiming 
beyond the specification is “too far” and thereby triggers the need to narrow 
the claim.  Textual interpretation can only tell us how much broader the 
claim is; it does not answer the current claim construction inquiry with its 
(largely unnoticed) policy focus. 
2. Claim Construction as an Abstraction-Oriented Inquiry.—Rather 
than linguistic vagueness, the disagreement between the two claim con-
struction camps is over the permitted level of abstraction.  Interpreting 
claims in light of the specification—that is, importing limitations from the 
specification—has the effect of reducing the abstractness of a claim and its 
corresponding scope.  A physical embodiment is the least abstract rung of 
the abstraction ladder: it is specific down to the last atom.  A specification 
description is slightly more abstract than a physical embodiment because 
the written description of an embodiment usually omits very minor details 
such as the precise paint color.  But the specification description is still 
 
193  Cf. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 261 
(1974) (stating that to classify the denial of a patent as an extreme form of scope reduction would be a 
“semantic trick”). 
194  See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876) (reasoning that there is “no excuse for ambi-
guous language or vague descriptions”); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“An essential 
purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous.  
Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible . . . .”).  Of course, 
all else is not always equal, and perfect clarity might entail excessive transaction costs.  Doug Lichtman, 
Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2016 
(2005) (arguing that drafting perfect claims is too difficult). 
195  Kinetic Concepts, 554 F.3d at 1019. 
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more specific than even the narrowest claim.  Thus, the contextualist school 
predictably narrows patent scope because it hews more closely to the speci-
fication description.196   
On the other hand, because patentees draft claim language, they natu-
rally draft very general (and hence broad) claims.  A court that gives effect 
to this broad text—drafted by the patentee—gives broader patent scope than 
one that limits claims using the specification embodiment.197 
The levels of abstraction framework makes clear that, contrary to the 
conventional assumption, the real disagreement is not about interpretative 
methodology.198  Rather, the conflict is over substantive scope: whether and 
to what extent claims cover more embodiments than disclosed by the speci-
fication.  As Kinetic Concepts candidly acknowledged, creative “interpreta-
tion” (i.e., the importation of limitations) is triggered by a claim going too 
far beyond the specification embodiment.  But how far is too far?  The de-
gree to which claim breadth should extend beyond a specification embodi-
ment is, like the proper length of patent’s term, a matter of policy.199  The 
core problem of current claim construction doctrine is that no one knows 
where the claim lines lie because the judges themselves disagree on where 
that normative line lies. 
D. Enablement, Scope, and Undue Experimentation 
The levels of abstraction framework also illuminates the problems of 
the enablement standard.  The enablement inquiry, which asks whether the 
specification permits a person of ordinary skill in the art to make the full 
scope of the claim,200 poses a question that is almost nonsensical once the 
real nature of a claim is understood.  Because the claim reflects an abstrac-
tion—an idea—it is impossible to “make” anything so intangible.201  Nor is 
it ever possible to explicitly teach someone to make every embodiment that 
encompasses the idea because even minor technological advances will 
quickly permit new embodiments to incorporate the idea and render even 
 
196  See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope 
Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 105–09 (2005) (discussing the scope effect of using the speci-
fication to interpret claims). 
197  See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 174, at 1142 (predicting that a procedural (textualist) 
approach will yield broader constructions than a holistic (contextualist) approach). 
198  Cf. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (order granting re-
hearing en banc to determine whether “the public notice function of patent claims [is] better served by 
referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a 
claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification”). 
199  Merges & Nelson, supra note 34, at 842 (discussing economic effects of varying patent scope). 
200  Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Merges & Nel-
son, supra note 34, at 845. 
201  See supra Part II.A. 
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the most detailed specification outdated.202  Even the concept of implicit 
teaching and allowance for ordinary skill in the field cannot save the 
enablement standard because future improvements—even very minor 
ones—are by definition excluded from the skill of the field at the time of 
filing.203 
This is not to say that the concept of making the invention without un-
due experimentation by a person of ordinary skill has no relevance.  But it 
pertains only to embodiments—the “invention” of the specification.  In oth-
er words, current enablement doctrine is attempting to capture two distinct 
functions.  The first, ensuring that the specification contains a working em-
bodiment, fits coherently into the “make without undue experimentation” 
test.204  The second, ensuring that the idea claimed is adequately disclosed in 
the specification, does not.  Merging these distinct purposes into a single 
test means that the second function—claiming ideas and determining 
scope—has been ill-served.  Taking this second function out of the enable-
ment doctrine will let the doctrine serve its first function more coherently 
and allow some another doctrine to better effectuate the second function as 
well. 
The first function of ensuring the specification teaches at least one 
working embodiment is important because the working embodiment is the 
basis of the patentee’s contribution.  When applying this intuition, it also 
makes sense to remember that no embodiment works unfailingly: drugs 
rarely achieve 100% effectiveness, computers crash, and light bulbs burn 
out.  Some degree of experimentation and some tolerance for failure are re-
quired.  Thus, in asking what embodiments the patentee has disclosed, the 
current test of whether the specification teaches a person having ordinary 
skill in the art how “to make and use the invention without undue experi-
mentation”205 makes sense as long as the invention is understood to refer to 
a working specification embodiment.  The test tells us how many embodi-
ments the patentee has given society through the patent, including whether 
the patentee passes the minimum threshold of at least one working embo-
diment. 
The problems of the current enablement test arise because it is also 
used to police patent scope and thus intrudes into the policy question posed 
by the levels of abstraction framework.  Above the minimum floor of pro-
tecting against literal replication of those embodiments the patentee has 
 
202  See supra text accompanying notes 111–21. 
203  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
204  In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a specification must teach 
how to “make and use the invention without undue experimentation”). 
205  Id. at 737. 
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taught,206 patent scope becomes a policy question: given the working embo-
diments taught today, how many other embodiments should the patentee get 
for the next twenty years?207  In return for one or a few working cures for 
AIDS today, how many future variants of the cure for AIDS—which are 
unknown today and may be better, faster, or cheaper—are we willing to 
give up over twenty years?208  This ultimately translates into a larger norma-
tive question: how broad an idea should patent law protect? 
Under the full scope rule, the formalist answer is that no future embo-
diments, and hence no “idea,” can be claimed.209  Only replication of the 
embodiments that are actually or constructively enabled at the time of filing 
can be covered by a patent.  But this is unlikely to be the right answer, or 
even the answer that courts would give in a case like the cure for AIDS.210  
Given the pressing nature of the AIDS crisis and the need to solve it quick-
ly, one cure under monopoly today is better than two cures under free com-
petition many years down the road.  Thus, the true patent bargain is not 
disclosure in exchange for twenty years of monopoly on the thing disclosed.  
The true patent bargain is this: one working embodiment today in exchange 
for a broader monopoly lasting twenty years211 that covers some range of fu-
ture improvements and variants otherwise known as after-arising technolo-
gy.212  The bargain is often worthwhile because the pressing concern of the 
moment often outweighs the later consequences of monopoly.  But deter-
mining how much broader is an unavoidable policy question for which 
 
206  Of course, even under the narrowest formulation of patent scope, the patentee would receive 
protection against literal replication of the embodiments taught, including the embodiments taught con-
structively.  But because this would exclude even the most minor variant based on later-arising technol-
ogy, it is clearly too narrow. 
207  See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 108 (3d ed. 2009) (“Deceptively simple on its face, the 
task of awarding the ‘right’ claim scope for a particular disclosure . . . actually involves a delicate ba-
lancing of policy concerns.”). 
208  See generally Lefstin, supra note 111 (discussing the problems of the enablement doctrine). 
209  Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (“The scope of enablement . . . is that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of 
what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.”). 
210  Collins, supra note 115, at 558 (“Although patent doctrine requires courts to stabilize the literal 
scope of a claim at the time of filing, courts routinely allow claims to grow and encompass [after-arising 
technology].”); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-
Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 379 n.73 (1992) (arguing that courts treat scope differently for 
enablement and infringement). 
211  The patent expires twenty years from filing.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
212  It is worth repeating that everything that is not taught by the patentee constitutes either prior art 
or after-arising technology.  See supra text accompanying notes 128–33.  Everyone agrees that patents 
protect against literal replication of embodiments taught by the patentee, and everyone agrees that pa-
tents should never cover the prior art.  Thus, the debate over patent scope can be viewed as one about 
whether, and to what extent, patents can encompass after-arising technology. 
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formalistic enablement tests provide either no answer or an answer (i.e., ze-
ro) that is simply unacceptable.213 
III. A LEGAL REALIST APPROACH TO PATENT SCOPE 
A. The Unavoidable Policy Question 
Copyright scholars will have noticed the similarity of this analysis to 
the famous Learned Hand “abstractions test” in copyright law.  Judge Hand 
observed that in determining whether two nonidentical stories were none-
theless “substantially similar,” thus making one an illegal copy of the oth-
er,214 much depended on how abstractly the original story is characterized 
by the court and the level of generality at which similarity is compared.215  
According to Judge Hand: 
It is of course essential to any protection of literary property . . . that the right 
cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by imma-
terial variations.  That has never been the law, but, as soon as literal appropria-
tion ceases to be the test, the whole matter is necessarily at large . . . .  Upon 
any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing 
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.  
The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the 
play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in 
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected . . . .  Nobody has 
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.216 
Because no logical principle can determine the proper degree of abstraction, 
the question is necessarily “at large”—a matter of policy.  And while no-
body has been able fix the boundary using formalist methods of logic, text, 
and precedent, it must be noted that judges “fix” the boundary in some 
sense every time they decide a patent or copyright case.  By determining 
whether a product is or is not infringing, they determine whether it falls 
within or without the boundary.  Hand’s insight into the levels of abstrac-
tion problem in copyright translates directly into patent law. 
To illustrate with a copyright example, Snow White can be described as 
a story of a princess living with seven dwarves, who eats a poisoned apple 
from her evil stepmother and then meets a handsome prince.217  Insisting on 
 
213  See Collins, supra note 130, at 1088–89 (arguing that the Federal Circuit in practice applies a 
“reasonableness” test that is a “fact-intensive, fuzzy, and unclear standard”). 
214  A prima facie case of copyright infringement is met by proving both access to the copyrighted 
work and substantial similarities between the copyrighted work and the accused work.  See Folio Im-
pressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991). 
215  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
216  Id. 
217  Jacob Grimm & Wilhelm Grimm, Schneewittchen (Snow White), in THE GRIMMS’ GERMAN 
FOLK TALES 192 (Francis P. Magoun, Jr. & Alexander H. Krappe trans., 1960). 
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this relatively specific characterization of the story and requiring every 
element of the story to be copied for copyright infringement would allow a 
pirate to write an almost identical story, changing only the evil stepmother 
into an evil aunt.  But once we start dropping elements, so that the apple can 
come from anybody, then we are simply moving up the abstraction ladder, 
“as more and more of the incident is left out.”218  If the apple does not need 
to come from an evil stepmother for a subsequent work to plagiarize, then 
why does there need to be a poisoned apple at all?  Any story with seven 
dwarves and a princess meeting a handsome prince still sounds a lot like 
Snow White.  But at the end of this slippery slope, Snow White becomes de-
scribed very abstractly as a story of “boy meets girl,” at which point practi-
cally every novel in existence is a “copy.” 
The process is identical in patent law.219  From the patentee’s original 
machine that cures AIDS using X-radiation, “a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well.”220  To insist upon confining the 
invention to the specification’s exact embodiment would allow “the unscru-
pulous copyist” to escape infringement by making “unimportant and insubs-
tantial changes.”221  But once we start dropping elements, saying that the 
precise nuts and bolts in the specification are not required and that any me-
thod of assembly will do, there is no natural stopping point as to what inci-
dents may be left out.  If the particular nuts and bolts do not matter, then 
why does using X-radiation in particular matter?222  The end of the slippery 
slope is that the invention does not even need to be a machine, at which 
point the patent covers anything that cures AIDS, including a later-invented 
pill that bears no resemblance to a radiation machine.223 
Judge Hand’s abstractions test has spawned an enormous literature in 
copyright law, but no one has yet fixed a rule that distinguishes the level of 
 
218  Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
219  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 35; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equiva-
lents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1160 (2004); Richard H. 
Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business, 
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 110 (1999). 
220   Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121; see also Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 
83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 68 n.155 (2008) (“[A]n invention, if subjected to a ‘great number of patterns of 
increasing generality,’ could be conceptualized as a combination of scientific principles and mechanical 
forces.” (quoting Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121)). 
221  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
222  One response might be that X-radiation is what is novel about the machine.  The point is that 
beyond the requirements of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness, there remains an infinite spectrum 
of abstractions.  A machine that cures AIDS using any other type of radiation would still be new, useful, 
and nonobvious. 
223  See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 693–94 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, 
J.) (applying a similar analysis in a patent case and concluding that permissible abstraction is “always a 
question of degree, and courts have differed, and always will differ, as to the allowable latitude in a giv-
en instance”). 
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abstraction that copyright protects from what it does not.224  There is no le-
gally “correct” answer to the level of abstraction inquiry.225  At least, the an-
swer will not come from traditional legal sources of statutory text and 
judicial precedent.  Rather, in copyright law, the legal conclusion of wheth-
er something is an unprotected idea is “prompted by notions—often unarti-
culated and unproven—of appropriate competition.”226  As the Ninth Circuit 
candidly put it, “The guiding consideration in drawing the line is the pre-
servation of the balance between competition and protection reflected in the 
patent and copyright laws.”227  In short, the selection of the level of abstrac-
tion is a matter of judge-crafted economic policy.228 
In contrast to the acceptance of flexible scope in copyright law, patent 
law attempts to remove bureaucratic and judicial discretion.  The creator of 
a new, useful, and nonobvious invention is “entitled” to his patent.229  The 
notion that judges have tremendous discretionary control over the practical 
value of that patent—by defining the “invention” at different levels of ab-
straction—brings tremendous unease to patent lawyers because the conse-
quence appears to be that the reward for innovation becomes a matter of 
judicial whim.230  Courts therefore adopt an ostrich-in-the-sand posture of 
denying they possess any discretion at all.231 
To this ostrich-in-the-sand avoidance, there are three responses.  First, 
pragmatic use of judicial discretion to determine patent scope is how the 
current system actually works, and pretending otherwise is deceptive and 
unhelpful.  Every invention lies on a spectrum of abstractions, and the rules 
that determine which level of abstraction deserves protection are so self-
 
224  Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d. Cir. 1960) (“Obviously, 
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed 
its ‘expression.’  Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”).  See generally Amy B. Cohen, Copy-
right Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic 
Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990) (arguing that copyright law lacks any objective basis to de-
termine the proper level of abstraction and that artistic value judgments are inevitable). 
225  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 52–54; see also Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Pers-
pective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 
38 EMORY L.J. 393, 405 (1989) (contending that “the Nichols opinion never stated any principle which 
tells the court where to draw the line between idea and expression”).   
226  Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After 
Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 346 (1992).  
227  Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971); see also 
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (creating an “abstraction-
filtration-comparison” approach based on “the necessary balance between creative incentive and indus-
trial competition”). 
228  Alan L. Durham, Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an Alternative Model of “Author-
ship,” 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 96–97. 
229  35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006). 
230  See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
231  See id.; see also Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (rejecting the argument that there is a “dichotomy in our case law”). 
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contradictory that they are practically nonexistent, resulting in wide discre-
tion to judges.232  Even if this state of affairs were normatively undesirable, 
an accurate recognition of the present is a prerequisite for future reform. 
Second, as a normative matter, it is not clear that judicial discretion in 
this area is a bad thing.  After all, the levels of abstraction problem has ex-
isted for the entire history of the patent system in the United States and 
elsewhere.  Thus, broad judicial discretion over patent scope is compatible 
with a functioning patent system and with providing adequate incentives for 
innovation. 
Finally, there is no clearly superior alternative.  Taking discretion over 
patent scope away from judges necessarily places the decision in the hands 
of some other government entity to limit patentee demands, or the result 
would be patents of unlimited scope.  The obvious candidates are Congress 
and the PTO.  Both must determine patent scope ex ante and, in the case of 
Congress, a great deal ex ante through the use of blunt legislative rules.  
This poses a problem given that judges determine scope through ex post ad-
judication, when more information is available.233  If, as is almost certainly 
the case, judges have a difficult time determining optimal scope ex post be-
cause of the complexity of the inquiry, then it is almost impossible to im-
agine how Congress or the PTO will have the capability to determine a 
method of computing optimal (or at least better) scope ex ante when less in-
formation is available.234 
B. Considerations in the Policy Balance 
Once we acknowledge that judges currently have (and will likely al-
ways have) substantial discretion in determining patent scope, the question 
becomes how such discretion should be exercised. The difficulty here is 
that patent scope presents a core conflict235: broader patent scope favors an 
initial invention but hampers subsequent improvement and use;236 narrower 
patent scope favors subsequent improvers and users, but without an initial 
 
232  See Merges & Nelson, supra note 34, at 841 (arguing that there is considerable discretion over 
scope, and economic policy should inform how discretion is exercised). 
233  Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577 
(1992) (noting the comparative advantages of governing ex post through standards versus governing ex 
ante through rules). 
234  Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Neither Congress nor the courts has 
the information that would allow it to determine [optimal copyright scope].  Both institutions must mud-
dle through . . . .”). 
235  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (“The tension between 
the desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create an incen-
tive to deploy those resources is constant.”). 
236  See Merges & Nelson, supra note 34, at 843.  But see Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Func-
tion of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (arguing that patents encourage subsequent inven-
tion by allowing the first inventor to control later development). 
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pioneer, there would be nothing upon which to improve and nothing to use.  
Courts that have policy discretion to select one of many levels of abstrac-
tion should refrain from adopting absolutist rules that reach “either extreme 
of the continuum of generality.”237 
Thus, if we promise the first inventor of a cure for AIDS that he or she 
will control all variants of anything that cures AIDS (e.g., whether a radia-
tion machine, a pill, or anything else), the incentive to create that first work-
ing embodiment will be very large.  But once the first working embodiment 
is achieved, later improvements are hampered by the monopoly.  This can 
be tremendously costly because those later variants may be cheaper or more 
effective.  If the first working embodiment cures AIDS 50% of the time, do 
we really want the monopoly to cover, and thus preclude, a later cure that 
works 90% of the time?  In limiting the scope of Morse’s patent on the tele-
graph, the Supreme Court relied on precisely this concern: “For aught that 
we now know some future inventor” may create a better telegraph than 
what Morse taught, “[b]ut yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor 
could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission 
of this patentee.”238 
On the other hand, some degree of control beyond the precise embo-
diment is necessary for patent incentives to work.  If the patent’s scope is 
confined to precise replication of the first working embodiment, then pirates 
would quickly learn to copy the principle or the heart of the patent without 
replicating the precise embodiment.  With very few exceptions,239 protection 
limited to literal reproduction is worthless and easily circumvented.  A good 
historical example is Eli Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin, one of the 
most important discoveries in American history.240  Because of the narrow 
scope of patent protection at the time, Whitney received almost no reward 
for this revolutionary invention because farmers simply created nearly (but 
not completely) identical apparatuses.241  Courts granting broad protection 
 
237  Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540. 
238  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853). 
239  One exception that comes to mind is a novel chemical element, where protecting only the speci-
fied embodiment may still confer significant value.  See, e.g., In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 
1964) (patent on chemical element 95, Americium).  But even here, this is a matter of abstraction, for a 
chemical element will have numerous isotopes.  Does the first creator of one isotope get to control every 
later isotope? 
240  Of course, like almost every other famous inventor, Whitney did not really “create” the cotton 
gin.  He only improved earlier gins.  See ANGELA LAKWETE, INVENTING THE COTTON GIN: MACHINE 
AND MYTH IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA, at viii (2003) (arguing that “Eli Whitney patented not the first 
but a new type of gin”).  In this way, every inventor relies on the prior contributions of others. 
241  Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 
113, 113–14 (1990).  
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thus frequently cite the necessity of providing sufficient reward to create in-
centives.242 
Moreover, not only is protection beyond literal reproduction of the pa-
tentee’s creation necessary for the patent incentive to work, it can also be 
socially beneficial.  The key here is a difference in timing: society gets the 
first working embodiment immediately, but the improvements that are 
hampered occur only in the future.  And without the first working embodi-
ment as a guide, the improvements might never even exist at all, or at least 
would be delayed even further absent the patentee’s pioneering efforts.  Al-
lowing the Wright brothers’ barely working glider to morph into a monopo-
ly covering the F-117 jet would not be bad if, without the Wright brothers’ 
glider, no one would have ever developed the F-117 jet.  Allowing the first 
person who develops a 50%-effective cure for a raging pandemic to obtain 
a monopoly that covers a later 90%-effective cure is not bad if, without the 
50% cure, the human race would be extinct before the 90%-effective cure is 
discovered.  Under such assumptions, the only thing “‘monopolized’ and 
sold at too low quantities is a product that would be sold in even lower 
quantity—zero—if there were no ‘monopoly’” in the first place.243 
Between these two competing goals of providing initial incentives and 
permitting subsequent improvement and use, there is an optimal point of 
abstraction and scope that maximizes economic welfare.  Of course, this op-
timal point is very difficult to discern and will likely vary by industry or 
even individual patent.244  My goal in this Article is not to articulate a rule 
that reaches the right answer.  Rather, my aim is to note that courts are like-
ly to get closer to the right answer if they confront the question openly and 
allow litigants to supply them with information that addresses the actual 
question.  The current debate over textual meaning and specification disclo-
sures does not address the question of how far scope should extend beyond 
the embodiments taught by the specification in order to maximize social 
welfare.  Neither dictionaries nor specifications will help answer that nor-
mative question.  What will help provide an answer is an assessment of the 
social benefits of the pioneer’s work, the incentives necessary to achieve 
this breakthrough, the cost of monopoly in terms of what later research has 
been or will be hampered, and the extent to which subsequent research is 
derived from the pioneer’s work.   
 
242  See, e.g.,  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (“[C]ourts 
have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal 
detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”); Invitro-
gen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
243  JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 5:36 (2d ed. 2006). 
244  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1615 
(2003) (arguing that optimal rules will vary by industry). 
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Instead of looking to dictionaries and specifications, courts would do 
better to consider the real-world economic facts and the enormous econom-
ic literature on how to determine optimal patent scope.245  Such a policy-
oriented inquiry has been done in the copyright arena since Learned Hand 
articulated the problem in 1930.246  There remains no bright-line rule on the 
level of abstraction that copyright law will protect.  But the abstractions test 
provides an enormously useful framework, which reminds judges of “the 
difficulties that require courts to avoid either extreme of the continuum of 
generality.”247  Every copyright court understands that scope lies on a spec-
trum of abstractions and the problems created by going to either extreme—
either destroying incentives or crippling improvement.  As a result, copy-
right law has refrained from absolutist rules such as confining scope to lit-
eral reproduction of the intellectual property owner’s creation (as the full 
scope rule effectively does)248 or the opposite extreme of permitting unli-
mited abstraction (as the one-embodiment-enables-everything rule does).249  
And although copyright courts still do not have sufficient information to 
compute optimal scope,250 their awareness of the problem at least opens the 
door to making the inquiry.251 
Finally, it is important to point out that the implementation of stan-
dards is less prone to arbitrariness in intellectual property law than other 
areas 252  because widespread consensus exists on the normative frame-
work—economic utilitarianism.253  This means that disagreement about pa-
 
245  See Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 
106, 108–11 (1990); Kitch, supra note 236, at 285–86 (arguing for broader patents to pioneers that allow 
them to direct subsequent development in an orderly manner); Klemperer, supra note 241, at 116–19; 
Merges & Nelson, supra note 12, at 198–99 (arguing for narrower scope since “[w]ide patent scope that 
exceeds the enablement of the disclosure makes anyone who attempts to invent in that area beholden to 
the patent owner”). 
246  Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).  
247  Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frank-
lin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he line must be a pragmatic one.”). 
248  See supra text accompanying notes 103–10. 
249  See supra text accompanying notes 122–25. 
250  Nash, 899 F.2d at 1541. 
251  See generally Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in 
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1121 (1999).  As Socrates observed, the wise know what they do not know.  See PLATO, THE 
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES 39–40 (D.F. Nevill trans., 1901) (c. 399 B.C.E.). 
252  For example, one persistent problem in criminal law is disagreement about the underlying nor-
mative goals: is the goal of criminal law to deter, to punish, or to rehabilitate?  Even with perfect infor-
mation, judges will disagree about the optimal criminal sentence because they are seeking to achieve 
different normative ends.  See George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 689 (2000) (“The field of criminal theory should be thought of more as a human-
ist inquiry than as a social science.  The questions that concern us are not empirical.”). 
253  Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 23, 59 (2001); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inven-
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tent outcomes is largely empirical.  Although these empirical disagreements 
are very hard to resolve due to the paucity of information, there is at least 
an objectively “right” answer that everybody agrees the courts should be 
looking for.  This provides a rebuttal to the charge that allowing judicial 
discretion over patent scope is tantamount to allowing judges to indulge in 
subjective whim. 
Of course, collecting the necessary economic information to make in-
dividualized determinations about optimal scope would be very costly, and 
expending large amounts of administrative resources cannot be justified for 
the great majority of patents that eventually proves to be worthless.254  Thus, 
I do not mean to suggest that conducting an individualized economic analy-
sis for every patent is the right solution.  Rather than a perfectionist inquiry, 
rule-like safe harbors and presumptions may be necessary to achieve ad-
ministrative workability in the usual case,255 while reserving detailed indivi-
dualized analysis for only the most important patents. 256   A definitive 
answer to the rules versus standards trade-off is beyond the scope of this 
Article.257  My simple suggestion is that the current set of self-contradictory 
rules achieves the worst of both worlds.  Contradictory rules provide no real 
determinacy because any outcome can be justified by invoking whichever 
rule favors the outcome the appellate judge prefers.  Yet the presence of 
those rules deceives litigants into making arguments focused on contradic-
tory case law, deprives the courts of information relevant to the real under-
lying normative issue, confuses district judges by forcing them to reconcile 
precedent that is simply irreconcilable, frustrates nonlitigation licensing be-
tween patentees and their competitors because outcomes are difficult to 
predict without litigation, and reduces public accountability for courts as the 
real motives for a decision—the unspoken intuitions and hidden principles 
used to pick among the rules—are shielded from public scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                           
tions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 697–98 (2001); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–
81 (1974) (“The stated objective of the Constitution . . . is to ‘promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts.’  The patent laws . . . have a positive effect on society . . . by way of increased employment and 
better lives for our citizens.”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (“Congress in the ex-
ercise of the patent power may not . . . enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, 
advancement or social benefit gained thereby.”). 
254  Dennis Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 149–50 (2008). 
255  See Kaplow, supra note 233, at 577 (“Rules cost more to promulgate; standards cost more to en-
force.”). 
256  See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
1353 (arguing that patent law has, and should have, this type of layered analysis). 
257  See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257–58 (1974) (“discuss[ing] the conditions under which greater specificity or 
greater generality is the efficient choice” in legal rulemaking); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 
33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).  
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The problem is not with the rules per se but with their contradictory 
absolutism.  A properly formulated set of rules to determine patent scope 
should both serve a coherent and consistent purpose and reasonably corre-
late to the patent law’s underlying economic policy of balancing incentives 
with monopoly cost. 
For example, one rule-like presumption could be that derivative works 
(as distinct from independently developed products) should be presumed to 
be infringing even if they incorporate alterations and improvements.258  This 
follows from the rationale that if a defendant actively relied on the patent 
disclosure, then the accused product would not likely exist absent the pa-
tent.259  Similarly, Mark Lemley has suggested economics-based rules that 
consider infringer intent and prior secret use.260  We see that economics-
based rules can be formulated and, even if such rules are necessarily imper-
fect, they will at least consider and bear a correlation to the underlying eco-
nomic goal of balancing benefits and costs.  Whether done through rules or 
standards, or a mix of both, a more transparent scope analysis that selects 
among levels of abstraction using coherent economic principles will pro-
vide better normative results and greater predictability than current doc-
trine. 
C. Choosing a Doctrinal Vehicle 
The economic factors that inform the selection of a proper level of ab-
straction can easily be incorporated into the current framework of patent 
law.  Judges already inherently select the level of abstraction when they de-
termine whether some accused product falls within a patent’s scope.261  But 
they exercise this discretion silently.  The reform suggested here involves 
articulating and then properly analyzing an already-existing judicial role: 
one in which judges are guided in their preexisting discretion by considera-
tion of the policy effects of granting broader or narrower scope.262 
 
258  Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643 (2010) 
(suggesting that patents be limited to copying); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to 
Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006) (arguing that patent scope should be limited to cop-
ies and derivative works). 
259  See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 77 
(2008) (arguing that the patent system aims to “offer an incentive to create those inventions deemed to 
be beneficial to society that otherwise would not exist”). 
260  Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1525, 1532–35 (2007) (suggesting a modified willfulness test and prior user rights). 
261  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 50. 
262  The discretion is currently vested in the courts rather than the PTO, as the determination of pa-
tent scope is largely a legal question.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–
91 (1996) (holding that claim construction is a legal issue for judges); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Enablement, like obviousness, is a question of law which we independently re-
view . . . .”). 
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The question that follows is what precise doctrinal “hook” should be 
used to implement these policy decisions if the underlying economic con-
siderations are to be weighed openly.  Four primary doctrinal mechanisms 
are either in use today or have been used historically: claim construction, 
freestanding judicial scope determination without deference to patentee-
drafted claims, enablement based on § 112, and a common law “undue 
breadth” doctrine.  I shall discuss each possibility in turn, ultimately sug-
gesting that an independent undue breadth doctrine is the best option. 
1. Claim Construction.—As a practical matter, the current law de-
termines scope during claim construction.263  After the claims are construed, 
most cases settle or are resolved on summary judgment.264  Descriptively 
speaking, current claim construction doctrine is often manipulated to 
achieve the court’s desired scope.265  But is this kind of results-oriented 
claim construction normatively desirable?266 
One benefit of using claim construction as a doctrinal vehicle for poli-
cy analysis is that it has support in case law.  Although the modern Federal 
Circuit strongly condemns result-oriented claim construction (in rhetoric if 
not in practice),267 the Supreme Court has historically shown this approach 
much greater favor.  Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Eibel Process Co. v. 
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. is illustrative: 
In administering the patent law, the court first looks into the art to find what 
the real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is and whether it has ad-
vanced the art substantially.  If it has done so, then the court is liberal in its 
construction of the patent to secure to the inventor the reward he deserves.  If 
what he has done works only a slight step forward and that which he says is a 
discovery is on the border line between mere mechanical change and real in-
vention, then his patent, if sustained, will be given a narrow scope and in-
fringement will be found only in approximate copies of the new device.268 
 
263  See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact 
on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL. STUD. 85, 113 (2006) (arguing that a stronger presumption of validity 
caused more focus to be placed on the infringement inquiry). 
264  Lemley, supra note 181, at 102; see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always 
to decide the case.”).   
265  See supra text accompanying notes 198–99. 
266  See Cotropia, supra note 196, at 127–33 (arguing that claim construction is an effective policy 
lever). 
267  See supra text accompanying note 176; see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 30, at 802–03. 
268  261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923). 
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The problem with this approach is that, at the end of the day, claim 
construction must be anchored by claim language as a practical matter.269  If 
the patentee has written an overly narrow claim (however rarely this hap-
pens), there is only so much the court can do to expand it without appearing 
ridiculous, no matter what formal doctrine may allow.270  Similarly, a paten-
tee who mimics Samuel Morse and writes insistent language into a broad 
claim—e.g., “I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or 
parts”—will make it difficult for a court to narrow the claim down through 
interpretation.271  As the Court in Morse discovered, courts frequently need 
a hard limit on claim scope separate from the claim language drafted by the 
patentee. 
Of course, a court could construe claims by importing limitations from 
the specification embodiment even when the patentee is quite explicit in 
specifying otherwise.272  Again, current claim construction doctrine imposes 
no real constraints on judicial action.273  The constraints arise instead from 
common sense.  Courts cannot adopt wildly implausible constructions 
without looking ridiculous, even if not constrained by precedent.  In other 
words, a court that simply imposes claim scope by fiat, notwithstanding 
whatever the claim language says, ceases to do anything reasonably called 
“construction.”  Instead, such an approach essentially becomes a freestand-
ing scope doctrine in which judges determine scope independently.  This is 
undesirable because, as the next section discusses, claim language serves 
important notice and definition functions,274 and if claim language is not 
given any effect, then patentees would have no incentive to draft good 
claims.  Because giving effect to formal claim language is important, claim 
construction is not a suitable vehicle for implementing policy.275 
2. Freestanding Scope Determination.—An alternative to anchoring 
claim construction and scope determination in formal claim language is to 
simply disregard that language.  Courts could simply determine patent 
scope in the first instance according to the dictates of economic policy.  
 
269  See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“Without any claim term that is susceptible of clarification by the written description, there is no legi-
timate way to narrow the property right.”). 
270  Cf. Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 354 (1881) (“It was probably supposed that the 
patentee would never err in claiming too little.”). 
271  See supra text accompanying notes 83–85. 
272  E.g., Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Lourie, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that, although the patentee had an explicit definition, the definition should be ig-
nored because it was “totally negated by the remainder of the text of the patent”). 
273   See supra Part I.B; cf. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 
47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529 (1947) (describing how “external circumstances may be allowed to infil-
trate the text on the theory that they were part of it, written in ink discernible to the judicial eye”).  
274  See infra text accompanying notes 286–95. 
275  See infra text accompanying notes 294–98. 
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This means courts would simply pronounce the scope of a patent without 
invalidating claims but also without giving their language any effect.  Un-
der this approach, claims are basically irrelevant.276 
A regime of overtly disregarding claims and their language is almost 
inconceivable in modern patent law, in which the importance of written 
claims is routinely emphasized.277  It is, however, not as radical as one 
might think.  Such a regime describes copyright law, in which courts de-
termine the scope of a copyright through the Hand abstraction framework 
without anything resembling claims.  And it describes American patent law 
prior to 1809, when patents were not accompanied by meaningful claims.278 
Before claims existed, courts determined patent infringement by com-
paring the specification embodiment to the accused product and asking 
whether the two were “substantially, in their principles and mode of opera-
tion, [a]like.”279  This analysis likewise turned entirely on the level of ab-
straction at which the court considered the product’s “principle.” 280  
Virtually everything shares a “principle” or “idea” at some level of abstrac-
tion: everything is made of atoms and operates under the principles of phys-
ics.  By determining the governing principle of a patent, courts determined 
the level of abstraction and patent scope.281  Early American patent law 
shows that it is more than possible for courts to pronounce patent scope 
without reference to patentee-drafted claims.  Indeed, modern patent law 
still technically allows courts to make such freestanding determinations of 
scope through the doctrine of equivalents (which allows courts to grant 
broader scope than the claim language)282 and the reverse doctrine of equi-
valents (which allows courts to narrow scope notwithstanding any literal 
 
276  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 50, at 1746–47 (arguing for the abandonment of peripheral 
claims). 
277  In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he name of the game is the claim.” 
(citing Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American Perspec-
tives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990))); John F. Duffy, On Improving the 
Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 109 
(2000) (“Claims are the most important part of the modern patent document.”); Paul M. Janicke, When 
Patents Are Broadened Midstream: A Compromise Solution to Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 
66 U. CINN. L. REV. 7, 16 (1997) (noting that the “entirety of patent law centers around” claims). 
278  See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. 
REV. 755, 758 (1948) (tracing the first patent claims to Robert Fulton’s patent on the steamboat). 
279  Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432). 
280  See supra text accompanying notes 215–21. 
281  See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 731–35 (2009) 
(describing the history of claiming). 
282  This freestanding discretion has been cabined somewhat after Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chemical Co., which required analysis of substantial similarity to follow the structure of a claim 
even if not its literal language.  520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
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claim language).283  The essential question in the equivalence inquiry re-
mains whether the elements of two products have “insubstantial differenc-
es,”284 and the answer largely depends on the level of abstraction at which 
the similarities and differences are compared.285 
However, as much as history and experience show that a regime of 
freestanding scope pronouncement without claims is possible, they also 
show that such a regime is unwise.286  Claims predominate today because of 
our experience with this history,287 and both the doctrine of equivalents and 
the reverse doctrine of equivalents are now largely moribund.288  One fre-
quently cited benefit of defining scope through claims is the vagueness and 
unpredictability of the “substantial similarity” test,289 though this benefit is 
questionable given the uncertainty of claim construction doctrine.290  A far 
more important reason for requiring claims is the patentee’s comparative in-
formation advantage at the time of patent filing.291  A patentee, more than 
any other participant in the patent system, is likely to know which features 
of his embodiment are novel and which are not, and what he regarded as 
important to his own incentives when filing for the patent.292  Thus, even if 
claims are drafted at a very high level of generality, they at least force the 
 
283  Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 569 (1898) (describing the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents). 
284  Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39–40. 
285  See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 806 (using an example of two forks, with equivalence 
depending on whether you compare them at the level of individual tines or as generic forks). 
286  See generally John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar 
of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 309–10 (describing the emergence of claims to address problems 
created by the substantial similarity test). 
287  Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (noting that formal claims are “of primary impor-
tance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented”). 
288  Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The reverse doc-
trine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of non-infringement 
under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) De-
mise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007) (arguing that, as a practical mat-
ter, the doctrine of equivalents is largely dead).  Neither doctrine, though, is completely dead, and the 
statement in Roche Palo Alto is artfully worded: the Federal Circuit has itself applied the reverse doc-
trine of equivalents, e.g., Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (reversing a finding of infringement), but it has never affirmed a lower court that did so. 
289  See Sarnoff, supra note 219, at 1198 (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents causes uncertainty 
and additional litigation costs). 
290  See supra Part I.B; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 50, at 1791–92 (“The simple answer to 
those who worry about the failure of public notice under central claiming is that peripheral claiming has 
already failed in that function, and in fact has failed catastrophically.”). 
291  Chiang, supra note 76, at 542–43. 
292  Kintner v. Atl. Commc’n Co., 240 F. 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1917) (“[T]he patentee is conclusively 
presumed to have known what he invented or discovered, better than did any one else, at the time he ap-
plied for a patent.”). 
105:1097  (2011) The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law 
 1147
patentee to disclose this knowledge to some extent. 293   Patentee-drafted 
claims thus have an information-forcing function, and this benefit is lost in 
a freestanding abstraction doctrine.  Patentees would not have any incentive 
to draft precise claims if courts simply ignored them.  Thus, the information 
advantages of having formal claims suggest that we should seek some other 
vehicle for determining the proper level of abstraction, one that does not re-
quire completely ignoring claim language. 
3. Enablement and Written Description Under § 112.—If, as the 
above analysis indicates, having patentee-drafted claims is a good thing, 
then claims must be given a certain measure of effect.  The implication is 
that courts should formalistically construe claims without subtly undermin-
ing claim language through creative interpretations that seek to achieve pol-
icy goals.294  This does not mean that courts will never consider policy.  
Rather, the time to do so is after the claim has been formalistically con-
strued.  By formalistically following patentee intent during claim construc-
tion—determining exactly what monopoly the patentee seeks—no matter 
how broad, courts can then use invalidity or rejection to control whether the 
patentee should get the claimed monopoly as a policy matter.  The hard lim-
it of invalidity, which has no patentee-set anchor like claim language, is a 
much better vehicle for implementing judicial policy than claim construc-
tion doctrine.295  The added bonus is that this mechanism allows claim lan-
guage to be given some effect because anything not claimed would be 
forfeited by the patentee,296 thereby preserving the incentive for patentees to 
draft good claims and in the process disclose their private information. 
At least sometimes, the Federal Circuit already follows this pattern of 
formalistically construing the claim and then afterwards applying invalidity 
doctrine to police scope, and the enablement doctrine serves as the doctrinal 
vehicle.  A good example of this is Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., in 
which the Federal Circuit initially rejected the accused infringer’s plea to 
creatively interpret a claim to the “opening” of a syringe, where the accused 
infringer argued that the claim should be limited to syringes that had pres-
sure jackets to protect the syringe from breaking under pressure because 
 
293  Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877) (holding that claims “re-
liev[ed] the courts from the duty of ascertaining the exact invention of the patentee by inference and 
conjecture, derived from a laborious examination of previous inventions, and a comparison thereof with 
that claimed by him”); Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 435 (1822) (noting that patentee ought 
to “describe what his own improvement is, and to limit his patent to such improvement”). 
294  See supra text accompanying notes 198–99. 
295  One complication is that invalidity analysis is currently distorted by a presumption of validity 
that biases courts against invalidating claims.  See Douglas Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking 
Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 51 (2007); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i 
Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011) (reaffirming heightened burden of proof). 
296  Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(holding that unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the public). 
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that was how the specification embodiment was set up.297  The court held 
that there was “no ambiguity in the term ‘opening’ and no reason to resolve 
the purported ambiguity by reading that term restrictively.”298  Subsequent-
ly, however, the court invalidated the claim for lack of enablement because 
the specification did not enable a person of skill in the art to make and use 
syringe openings without pressure jackets.299 
As shown by Liebel-Flarsheim, the enablement doctrine has sufficient 
flexibility to allow a court to implement policy decisions through its ru-
bric.300  So too does enablement’s close cousin, the written description doc-
trine. 301   Once a court decides that the scope of a patentee’s claim is 
overbroad under an economic policy-based abstraction analysis, the precise 
label used to strike the claim down matters little if everyone understands the 
real test being applied is an economics-based policy balancing.  The rejec-
tion may be classified under doctrines of enablement,302 written descrip-
tion, 303  patent eligibility, 304  or proper claiming. 305   If the analysis is 
transparent to everyone involved, then its labeling becomes largely an in-
consequential matter of semantics. 
One problem, however, is that enablement does not serve solely as a 
vehicle for economic balancing.  Although it is often invoked for this pur-
pose under current practice, it also serves a distinct and essential function of 
determining what embodiments the patentee has taught306 and ensuring that 
at least one working embodiment is among them.  This “one working em-
bodiment” aspect of enablement doctrine does not depend on abstraction or 
economic balancing, and it is not plagued by conflicting case law.  In fact, it 
works quite well.307  In contrast, the economics-based abstraction inquiry 
examines how far beyond the taught embodiments patent protection should 
extend, and the “undue experimentation” test does not answer this in-
 
297  358 F.3d 898, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
298  Id. 
299  Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
300  Id.; see also supra Part II.D. 
301  See supra text accompanying notes 105–10.  
302  E.g., In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
303  E.g., LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
304  See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 
570 (1863). 
305  E.g., Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (setting 
forth an honest claiming requirement); Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1053 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Ambiguity, undue breadth, vagueness, and triviality are matters which go to claim 
validity for failure to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112-¶ 2 . . . .”). 
306  Again, what the patentee has taught includes both the embodiments taught explicitly and those 
constructively disclosed by supplementing the specification with ordinary skill known at filing. 
307  See supra text accompanying note 205.  
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quiry.308  Framing both inquiries under the rubric of “enablement” is prone 
to causing confusion.  The danger is that courts will mesh the two purposes 
together and develop a single absolutist test, repeating the error of the unita-
ry invention principle. 
Likewise, the written description doctrine has an important timing 
function in addition to its function of policing scope.309  The timing function 
helps ensure that the currently claimed scope was intended by the patentee 
at the time of filing—a necessity because patentees can amend claims ex 
post.310  In other words, the written description requirement ensures that pa-
tentees do not retroactively expand the scope of their patent. Regardless of 
whether that expanded scope is justified by the calculation of incentives 
versus monopoly cost, its retroactivity causes independent problems of no-
tice.311  The possible confusion of these two distinct purposes and modes of 
analysis (preventing retroactivity versus preventing excessive monopoly 
scope) must be avoided. 
Thus, the drawback of using either enablement or written description 
doctrine as the vehicle for implementing economic policy balancing is that 
there is a risk of undermining the other functions served by these doctrines.  
This drawback is minor, though, because we can avoid the problem simply 
by constantly reminding courts of the difference in function while still using 
the label of “enablement” or “written description.”  Using the same label for 
what are really distinct doctrinal tools and concerns is common in the law, 
such as using the single label of “causation” to cover the distinct concepts 
of factual and proximate causation.312  Nonetheless, shared labels do in fact 
prove confusing and should be avoided if there is a simpler alternative.313 
4. Resurrecting the “Undue Breadth” Doctrine.—The preferred 
course would be to avoid shoehorning the problem of undue breadth into 
any of the established headings of invalidity (i.e., enablement, written de-
scription, unpatentable subject matter, and failure to claim) because of their 
 
308  See supra text accompanying notes 209–14. 
309  Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Bio-
technological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 620–23 (1998) (describing the operation of 
written description to prevent retroactive changes). 
310  Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he ‘written description’ 
requirement most often comes into play where claims not presented in the application when filed are 
presented thereafter.”). 
311  Chiang, supra note 76, at 525; Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the 
Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1653–54 (2007) (describing the problem of “misappropriation by 
amendment”). 
312  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). 
313  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL INJURY §§ 26–36 (2005) 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1) (distinguishing between “factual cause” and “scope of liability (proximate 
cause)”). 
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preexisting doctrinal baggage.314  Rather, undue abstraction may be identi-
fied as its own ground of invalidity with an economically oriented analysis 
that is distinct from current doctrine.  In many ways, this is simply restoring 
the historical approach of the PTO, which until 1970 rejected overly-
abstract claims for “undue breadth” instead of lack of enablement.315  The 
turn towards insisting that the analysis be conducted under the rubric of 
enablement or written description,316 which came about partly as a result of 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals’ penchant for formalist rhetoric,317 
has only confused an already difficult analysis and distorted the enablement 
and written description doctrines. 
This is not to say that the considerations that inform the current doc-
trines of enablement and written description are utterly irrelevant to the un-
due breadth analysis.  Rather, a separate doctrine is desirable precisely 
because the enablement test somewhat captures the problem but misses 
many critical distinctions.  For example, the current enablement test relies 
heavily on the concept of “undue experimentation,” and it applies this con-
cept identically to the inquiry of what the patentee has taught and the ab-
straction-oriented inquiry of what additional scope should be afforded.318  
This is a mistake because, although the degree of necessary experimentation 
is relevant to both inquiries, it affects the analysis in different ways. 
In determining what embodiments have been taught by the patentee in 
the specification, predictability is relevant because all predictable variants 
at the time of filing are considered constructively taught by the specifica-
tion.  In this context, predictability provides a straightforward lodestar: if a 
variant is predictable at the time of filing, it is constructively disclosed, with 
 
314  In addition to the problems with the enablement and written description doctrines, the other doc-
trines suffer from their own shortcomings.  Patentable subject matter tests exclude products of nature 
and other prohibited categories, regardless of abstraction.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).  Thus, a single moon rock specified down to its last atom is not patentable 
even though it is not abstract.  Failure to claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 2 is primarily directed 
to insolubly vague claims like claims to “aesthetically pleasing” objects.  See Datamize, LLC v. Plum-
tree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Vagueness and undue abstraction are dis-
tinct problems and should not be confused.  See supra text accompanying note 185. 
315  See In re Mayhew, 527 F.2d 1229, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (“Beginning 
in 1970, we departed from a vast line of authority which permitted the PTO to reject claims . . . for ‘un-
due breadth.’  Up to that time, examiners quite frequently determined what they felt the invention was 
and rejected all claims which were broader than their conception of the invention . . . .”). 
316  In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908–10 
(C.C.P.A. 1970). 
317  Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 858 (2010).  Notwith-
standing their formalist rhetoric, the CCPA judges could be very pragmatic when they perceived impor-
tant policy issues at stake.  Id. (“[CCPA Judge Giles Rich] was enough of a pragmatist to rely on 
common law development when he sought to implement a particular policy, notwithstanding the lack of 
a foundation in the statutory text.”). 
318  In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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the implication that the more predictable a technical field is, the more va-
riants are constructively disclosed.319 
The amount of experimentation required is also relevant to the eco-
nomics-based abstraction analysis but in a very different way.  Predictabili-
ty is relevant to economic balancing because the investment incentives of 
pioneers and subsequent improvers are both affected by the predictability of 
a field.  Given an innovative table, it is easy to quickly create a large range 
of improved tables because the principles of physics in this area are well-
established.  Given a pioneering cure for AIDS, though, it is difficult to 
create a large range of improved cures because the principles of medicine 
are complex.  The improver of an innovative table design has made only a 
small contribution over the pioneer; the improver of a cure for AIDS has 
made a large one.  Thus, predictability is a relevant consideration in deter-
mining both what the specification has constructively enabled and what ad-
ditional nonenabled embodiments should be covered by the patent. 
Just as the example demonstrates that predictability is relevant to the 
economic balancing test, however, it also illustrates critical distinctions that 
are prone to becoming lost in the rhetoric of a single enablement doctrine.  
In contrast to the straightforward lodestar that predictability provides in the 
context of determining what embodiments have been taught, where more 
predictability is always better for the patentee, predictability often cuts both 
ways in the context of economic balancing.  Medicine and biotechnology 
are generally less predictable than mechanical fields where the technology 
is more mature.320  This characteristic suggests that the scope of pioneering 
patents should be narrower in medicine and biotechnology where the con-
tribution of later improvements is greater.321  But the lack of predictability 
in medicine and biotechnology also means that pioneers need greater patent 
incentives.  It takes more investment to create a first cure for AIDS than it 
does to create a pioneering modern table.322  Thus, lack of predictability can 
be invoked to support greater or narrower scope depending on the circums-
tances. 
A separate doctrine of undue abstraction or undue breadth, divorced 
from enablement, would clarify how economic factors should affect patent 
scope and would force courts to more directly confront the levels of ab-
straction problem.  Forthrightly admitting that this economics-based analy-
 
319  See In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (creating “a dichotomy between predictable 
and unpredictable factors in any art” when analyzing enablement). 
320  See Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 
136–38 (2008) (contrasting “the predictable arts” of the applied sciences with the “the unpredictable 
arts” of the experimental sciences). 
321  See id. at 155–56 (arguing for a higher enablement requirement and thus narrower patents in un-
predictable fields). 
322  I concede that this is an imprecise statement because we can, of course, imagine a truly revolu-
tionary table that would require huge investments to design. 
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sis must take place would encourage litigants and judges to consider rele-
vant economic information instead of making seemingly arbitrary decisions 
based on contradictory rules of textual interpretation or some illusory doc-
trine that depicts patents as covering a mythical unitary invention. 
CONCLUSION 
The “invention” is the fundamental concept of patent law, but it actual-
ly comprises two distinct concepts.  On the one hand, the “invention” refers 
to an embodiment created by the patentee—a new, useful, and nonobvious 
embodiment is required for patentability.  On the other hand, the “inven-
tion” refers to an idea that exists within the embodiment (and the patent 
monopoly extends to the full scope of that idea) even when embodied in 
other machines or processes. 
The duality in the concept of invention requires extracting an idea from 
an embodiment when defining patent scope.  Because each embodiment 
contains many ideas, there is no inherently correct level of abstraction at 
which to define the idea that should be covered by the patent.  Thus, nearly 
every patent case involves a tug-of-war between a patentee’s claim to a 
higher level of abstraction, which promotes pioneer incentives, and the ac-
cused product’s claim to limit the patentee to the specific embodiment that 
he created, which reduces the monopoly cost of a patent.  Because the spe-
cific embodiment is considered to be the invention as much as the claimed 
idea, this tug-of-war has no intuitive resolution.  Instead, what has devel-
oped is contradictory doctrine that simultaneously requires the invention to 
be defined as the specification embodiment and absolutely forbids such im-
portation of limitations from the specification. 
Once we understand that every invention can be characterized as mul-
tiple ideas on many levels of abstraction, it becomes clear that a selection 
among them must be made.  The levels of abstraction problem is inherent to 
patent law; the only issue is the manner in which the level of abstraction 
should be selected.  Selection can be done either by the transparent balanc-
ing of competing interests or by the invocation of absolutist yet contradicto-
ry rules that yield no coherent principle.  Of course, one final option is 
rigidly enforcing only one absolutist rule, but such a course would create 
unacceptable consequences.  Rather, the best way to achieve accuracy and 
predictability in selecting a level of abstraction for patent scope is to make 
the process more transparent, increase the amount of available information, 
and strive to grant the degree of scope that achieves balance between incen-
tive benefits and monopoly costs.  Although the limitations of administra-
tive cost mean that perfection in economic balancing cannot be achieved, 
greater transparency in striving toward a generally shared normative goal 
will yield greater predictability and substantively more desirable results 
than the current regime of pretending to abide by a system of self-
contradictory rules. 
